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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The discipline of comparative constitutional law today is focused in 
significant part on the study of how and why judges use foreign precedent.
1
  
Scholars debate the propriety of using foreign precedent as “authority,”2 
circumstances under which such use is consistent with democracy (or a product 
of democratization),
3
 and which constitutional traditions may derive the 
greatest benefit from comparison.
4
  While comparative law theorists have long 
reflected on, and struggled with, a standard disciplinary vocabulary to describe 
what judges do when they engage in “comparative constitutional law,” the 
                                                        
1
 See generally VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL 
ERA 1 (2010) [hereinafter JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT] (reviewing recent 
legislative attempts to both restrict judicial borrowing and to expand it, as well as to identify 
the focus on judicial constitutional interpretation); JEREMY A. RABKIN, LAW WITHOUT 
NATIONS?: WHY CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT REQUIRES SOVEREIGN STATES 23 (2005); 
Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 57 (2004); Andrew R. Dennington, We Are the World?: Justifying the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Use of Contemporary Foreign Legal Practice in Atkins, Lawrence, and Roper, 29 B.C. INT’L 
& COMP. L. REV. 269 (2006);  Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 
AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 56 (2004); David S. Law & Wen-Chen Chang, The Limits of Global 
Judicial Dialogue, 86 WASH. L. REV. 523 (2011); Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already 
Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL AFF., July–Aug. 2004, at 40; Michael D. Ramsey, International 
Materials and Domestic Rights: Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 69 
(2004); Ganesh Sitaraman, The Use and Abuse of Foreign Law in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 653 (2009); Mark Tushnet, When Is Knowing Less 
Better than Knowing More? Unpacking the Controversy over Supreme Court Reference to 
Non-U.S. Law, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1275 (2006); Melissa A. Waters, Getting Beyond the 
Crossfire Phenomenon: A Militant Moderate’s Take on the Role of Foreign Authority in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 635 (2008).   
The focus on judicial behavior is just that—a focus.  Scholars are increasingly examining 
other types of constitutional convergence and divergence accomplished through comparison.  
See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of Constitutional Convergence, 11 CHI. 
J. INT’L L. 399, 422 (2011) (warning against overreliance on anecdotal evidence in the 
comparative constitutional context); Rosalind Dixon, Partial Constitutional Amendments, 13 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 643 (2011) (comparing the relative difficulty of constitutional amendment 
processes).  Certainly, in the past, scholars have focused on constitutional borrowing as part of 
the constitutional drafting or institutional design processes following decolonization or after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall.  See Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Constitutional Borrowing and 
Nonborrowing, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 196, 196–98 (2003).   
2
 See e.g., JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT, supra note 1 (noting legislatures, 
including the U.S. Congress, that have attempted to restrict judicial borrowing); Frederick 
Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931 (2008). 
3
 See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65–103 (2005); Rosalind Dixon, 
A Democratic Theory of Constitutional Comparison, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 947, 948–49 (2008); 
Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International 
Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA  L.J. 15, 40 (1998). 
4
 See Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, 52 UCLA 
L. REV. 639 (2005); Vicki C. Jackson, Transnational Discourse, Relational Authority, and the 
U.S. Court: Gender Equality, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 271 (2003) [hereinafter Jackson, 
Transnational Discourse]. 
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existing scholarship generally distributes judges’ use of foreign precedent into 
one of three modes of comparative adjudication.
5
  First, courts use foreign 
precedent to identify “universal” principles of law applicable across 
jurisdictions.  Second, courts sharpen understanding of domestic law through 
contrasting foreign judgments.  Third, courts use foreign authority to identify, 
then choose, constitutionally permissible options to solve jurisprudential or 
policy problems.
6
  These theories have a methodological approach in common:  
scholars analyze the treatment given certain foreign decisions and sort the 
cases into one category or another.
7
  
This Article is in part an effort to consolidate these descriptive 
categories.
8
  It is also aimed at building the body of scholarship devoted to 
constitutional borrowing as an activity undertaken by constitutional courts as 
part of their political competition with legislatures and executives.  
Specifically, judges may borrow from each other not only or even mostly in 
order to shed light on a constitutional dispute but rather to mutually reinforce 
the political authority of each to render orders, which scale back executive or 
legislative prerogatives.  By “constitutional borrowing”, I mean specifically 
judges’ consideration of decisions reached by judges in foreign jurisdictions in 
contrast to borrowing in the wider context of constitutional drafting or 
institutional design.
9
  
 Political scientists, of course, have long studied judiciaries as political 
actors whose incentive to compete or collaborate with other actors is shaped by 
a number of cultural, political, economic, and social factors.
10
  Judicial review 
                                                        
5
 See Taavi Annus, Comparative Constitutional Reasoning: The Law and Strategy of 
Selecting the Right Arguments, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 301 (2004); Dixon, supra note 3, 
at 948–49; Igor Stramignoni, The King’s One Too Many Eyes: Language, Thought, and 
Comparative Law, 2 UTAH L. REV. 739, 740–41 (2002); Catherine Valcke, Comparative Law 
as Comparative Jurisprudence—The Comparability of Legal Systems, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 713, 
715 (2004). 
6
 See Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of 
Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819 (1999). 
7
 JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT, supra note 1, at 9; Christopher McCrudden, 
A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional 
Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 499, 516–27 (2000); Shannon Ishiyama Smithey, A Tool, 
Not a Master: The Use of Foreign Case Law in Canada and South Africa, 34 COMP. POL. 
STUD. 1188 (2001).  The terminology differs, but the principles share basic analytic features.  
For example, Mark Tushnet may refer to the same process that a court undertakes in 
considering foreign precedent as “functional”, whereas Sujit Choudhry might call it 
“dialogical” and Roger Alford may say “pragmatic”.  In her recent and comprehensive work 
on the issue, Vicki Jackson refers to courts’ use of foreign precedent as “convergence”, 
“resistance”, and “engagement”, where “convergence” roughly approximates “universalism”, 
whereas “resistance” and “engagement” correspond to variations on what Choudhry refers to 
as “dialogical” or “genealogical” modes of constitutional interpretation. 
8
 See John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What is Corporate Law?, in 
THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 1, 4 (2d. ed. 2009) (noting the importance of comparative 
law for creating a common vocabulary and analytical method). 
9
 See Epstein & Knight, supra note 1. 
10
 See generally INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC LAW (Tom Ginsburg & Robert A. Kagan eds., 
2005) [hereinafter GINSBURG & KAGAN]; RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE 
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occupies a prominent role in this literature, as it brings into sharpest focus the 
assertion of judicial power, especially over elected and thus theoretically more 
legitimate actors, such as legislatures.  Judicial review, of course, is not a 
court’s only means of asserting claims to political authority.11  So, on the one 
hand, there is a rich literature authored principally by legal scholars studying 
the ways in which courts use foreign precedent to interpret constitutions and 
statutes.
12
  On the other hand, there is a similarly large effort undertaken to 
understand courts’ political power relative to legislatures and executives.13  
Legal scholars and political scientists have paid less attention to finding cases 
where both of these behaviors—the jurisprudential and the political—might be 
tested.  This Article presents one such effort.   
This Article applies existing theories of comparative constitutional 
interpretation
14
 to the Supreme Court of India’s judgment in Shri D.K. Basu v. 
State of West Bengal (D.K. Basu), confirming and expanding basic rights 
attaching to arrest and detention and compensatory remedies for violations of 
those rights.
15
  Drawing on constitutional precedent from the United 
                                                                                                                                                  
ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 12–13 (2004); Martin 
Shapiro, The Success of Judicial Review and Democracy, in ON LAW, POLITICS AND 
JUDICIALIZATION 149 (Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2002); David Landau, 
Political Institutions and Judicial Role in Comparative Constitutional Law, 51 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 319 (2010). 
11
 See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon, Creating Dialogue About Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-
Form Versus Weak-Form Judicial Review Revisited, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 391, 393 (2007) 
(arguing for a “commitment to constitutional ‘dialogue’ as the most desirable model of 
cooperation between courts and legislatures in the enforcement of socioeconomic rights”); 
David Fontana, Docket Control and the Success of Constitutional Courts, in COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 624, 633–34 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011) (noting 
alternative means by which constitutional courts acquire or cede power relative to other 
branches). 
12
 See, e.g., NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (2003); VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW (1999); Harold Hongju Koh, Paying “Decent Respect” to World Opinion on the Death 
Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1085, 1087–90 (2002).  See also Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 
990, 997 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Willingness to consider foreign judicial views in 
comparable cases is not surprising in a Nation that from its birth has given a ‘decent respect to 
the opinions of mankind.’”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (foreign material “may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the consequences of 
different solutions to a common legal problem . . . .”); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 
710 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional 
Adjudication, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (2003); Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, 
Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 253, 282 
(1999) (alteration in original) (“[C]omparative analysis emphatically is relevant 
to . . . interpreting constitutions and enforcing human rights.”); Stephen Breyer, Keynote 
Address Before the Ninety-Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Society of International 
Law (Apr. 4, 2003), in 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 265 (2003).   
13
 See GINSBURG & KAGAN, supra note 10; Shapiro, supra note 10; Landau, supra note 
10. 
14
 Choudhry, supra note 6. 
15
 Shri D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1996) 1 S.C.R. 416 (India).   
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Kingdom,
16
 the United States,
17
 Ireland,
18
 Trinidad and Tobago,
19
 and New 
Zealand,
20
 the Supreme Court of India elaborated the procedural framework to 
protect the rights of those arrested and detained from police abuse.  Generally 
celebrated as an exercise in comparative constitutional law, but rarely analyzed 
with any detail, the case is particularly useful because of the numerous sources 
of authority to which it refers to support a similarly large number of 
conclusions as to India’s constitutional principles.21  The Court fashioned its 
judgment so as to enhance its authority via the constitutional guarantee to the 
right to life—which the Supreme Court of India has generally used to order the 
enforcement of otherwise non-judiciable social and economic rights—as well 
as to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity for damages sustained as a result of 
abuse, injury, or death in police custody.
22
  The judgment also weighed foreign 
approaches to the measure and limits of money damages awarded as 
compensation.  In relying on foreign authority, the Supreme Court of India also 
emphasized its political role, expanding its oversight over police practices and 
vesting itself with the right to order money damages notwithstanding explicit 
acknowledgment that neither the constitution nor parliament had authorized it 
to do so.  The case, therefore, usefully tests whether existing theories 
adequately describe the process of comparative constitutional interpretation as 
well as exploring whether constitutional borrowing plays a role in 
constitutional courts’ claim to political authority.23   
                                                        
16
 Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60 (Eng.). 
17
 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
18
 The State (at the Prosecution of Quinn) v. Ryan, [1965] I.R. 70, 122 (Ir.); Byrne v. 
Ireland, [1972] I.R. 241 (Ir.). 
19
 Maharaj v. Att’y Gen. of Trin. & Tobago, [1979] A.C. 385. 
20
 Simpson v Att’y Gen. [Baigent’s Case] [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA). 
21
 See, e.g., Surya Deva, Human Rights Realization in an Era of Globalization: The Indian 
Experience, 12 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV.  93, 98 n.32 (2006); Jackson, Transnational 
Discourse, supra note 4, at 293–94 n.84 (2003); Jayanth K. Krishnan, Lawyering for a Cause 
and Experiences from Abroad, 94 CALIF. L. REV.  575, 604 n.181 (2006); Luzius Wildhaber, 
The European Court of Human Rights: The Past, The Present, The Future, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 521, 537 n.88 (2007). 
22
 Abhishek Singhvi, India’s Constitution and Individual Rights: Diverse Perspectives, 41 
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 327, 344–45 (2009) (citations omitted) (“Thus, Article 21 has been 
invoked in various civil and political rights cases, including pretrial release on bail bond, 
speedy trial for child offenders, award of compensation in public law writ jurisdiction, 
prohibition of cruel punishment, custodial excesses and deaths, delayed criminal trials, the 
requirements of a fair trial, and so forth.  It also has been invoked for broader issues, such as 
housing atomically active substances, the validity of beauty contests involving derogatory 
representation of women, environmental jurisprudence (including the Public Trust doctrine, the 
’Precautionary Principle,’ and the right to clean air and water), the right to health, housing, 
livelihood, and so forth.”). 
23
 See TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 2 (2003) (“This tension is particularly apparent where 
constitutionalism is safeguarded through judicial review.  One government body, unelected by 
the people, tells an elected body that its will is incompatible with the fundamental aspirations 
of the people.”); HIRSCHL, supra note 10, at 12–13 (using the examples of Canada, Israel, New 
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A focus on D.K. Basu is especially warranted given the regard with 
which that case—and more broadly the Supreme Court of India—is held by 
prominent jurists, comparative law scholars, and constitutional advocates.  
Luzius Wildhaber, former President of the European Court of Human Rights, 
in a speech delivered to the British Institute of Human Rights emphasizing the 
role of courts in providing an effective control over executive authorities, 
quoted D.K. Basu for the principle that “[t]he State must, therefore, ensure that 
various agencies deployed by it for combating terrorism act within the bounds 
of law and not become law unto themselves.”24  Bas de Gaay Fortman praises 
D.K. Basu for the independence and creativity exercised by the Supreme Court 
of India in fashioning procedural protections for detainees.
25
  Vicki Jackson 
cited D.K. Basu as part of the Supreme Court of India’s general willingness to 
use international law and foreign precedent to inform constitutional meaning.
26
 
Indeed, the Supreme Court of India occupies a prominent place in the 
field of comparative constitutional law generally.  More thoroughly detailed 
below, the Constitution of India drew upon the growing body of international 
human rights law as well as American, Australian, British, Canadian, German, 
and Irish constitutional features and provisions.
27
  The Supreme Court of India 
has therefore freely referred to foreign constitutional courts’ precedent from its 
inception.
28
  Together with the constitutional courts of South Africa and 
Germany, the Supreme Court of India’s jurisprudence “features prominently in 
the comparative law literature” both because of its constitutional history and 
because of its “strong commitment to democracy and rule of law in the face of 
significant developmental challenges and internal conflict and, in more recent 
decades, the activist approach of Indian courts to the enforcement of positive 
rights.”29  Because India both borrows and donates seminal constitutional 
decisions, it is a useful example through which to study constitutional courts’ 
borrowing more generally.  It is, of course, important to note that the Supreme 
                                                                                                                                                  
Zealand, and South Africa to explore the institutional incentives constitutional courts have to 
transfer authority from decision-making majoritarian bodies like legislatures to judiciaries). 
24
 Luzius Wildhaber, President, Eur. Court of Human Rights, Human Rights and 
Democracy 13 (Nov. 22, 2001), available at http://www.bihr.org.uk/sites/default/files/
wildhaber-transcript.pdf. 
25
 See Bas de Gaay Fortman, ‘Adventurous’ Judgments: A Comparative Exploration into 
Human Rights as a Moral-Political Force in Judicial Law Development, 2 UTRECHT L. REV. 
22, 34 (2006), available at http://www.utrechtlawreview.org/index.php/ulr/article/viewFile/
24/24. 
26
 Jackson, Transnational Discourse, supra note 4, at 294 n.84.   
27
 See generally Burt Neuborne, The Supreme Court of India, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 476 
(2003) (detailing the origins and influences of both India’s constitutional text and its 
constitutional court). 
28
 Sujit Choudhry, How to Do Comparative Constitutional Law in India: Naz Foundation, 
Same Sex Rights, and Dialogical Interpretation, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN 
SOUTH ASIA 45, 53 (Sunil Khilnani, Vikram Raghavan & Arun K. Thiruvengadam eds., 2013) 
(citing Adam M. Smith, Making Itself at Home: Understanding Foreign Law in Domestic 
Jurisprudence: The Indian Case, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 218 (2006)). 
29
 David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States 
Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 829–30 (2012) (footnotes omitted). 
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Court of India explicitly places itself within a large but discrete community of 
common law courts.  Constitutional courts in Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, for 
example, practice “scarce engagement in explicit comparative analysis.”30  
Even within the common law judicial community, not all courts participate in 
borrowing foreign precedent as robustly.  Thus, although D.K. Basu is 
significant both for its individual importance and the practice of the Supreme 
Court of India generally, it is worth noting potential limits on its applicability 
to the conduct of constitutional courts, especially those outside the common 
law tradition. 
Nevertheless, the basic conclusion provided herein is that there is some 
evidence that constitutional courts are forging a separate epistemic community, 
an independent source of political authority outside the constituent nations 
from which the judges decide.
31
  This community transcends the kind of 
“conferencing”, “dialogue”, or “engagement” fora advocated by specific treaty 
bodies, legal scholars, and individual jurists.
32
  In short, while constitutional 
                                                        
30
 Wen-Chen Chang & Jiunn-Rong Yeh, Internationalization of Constitutional Law, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1165, 1176 (Michel 
Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012). 
31
 See Jackson, Transnational Discourse, supra note 4, at 283 (citations omitted) 
(“References to transnational sources may relate not only to the place of the court’s nation in 
the community of nations, but also to the status and relationship of courts to each other in the 
development of law, thus fostering an autonomous professionalism of independent courts (to 
which end the display of knowledge alone may have some perceived value) and/or the 
autonomous content of law under the interpretive control of judges.  Recognizing the dignity 
and authority of other decision-makers may add to their legitimacy within their own legal 
orders, or confer it on others.”); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., “I’d Like to Teach the World to 
Sing (In Perfect Harmony)”: International Judicial Dialogue and the Muses—Reflections on 
the Perils and the Promise of International Judicial Dialogue, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1321, 
1325 (2006) (“The conversations plainly enhanced mutual understanding of how foreign 
constitutional courts function, the role that the courts play in domestic government, and the 
problems that the various courts confront in going about their job of safeguarding 
constitutional values.  At the same time, however, this lack of knowledge has rather serious 
implications for advocates of the strong form of IJD:  how can one reliably “borrow” a 
precedent when one lacks even the most rudimentary understanding of the institution that 
issued the opinion and the legal, social, and cultural constraints that provided the context for 
the decision?  A precedent is more than bare words on a page.  A precedent is the product of a 
socio-legal culture:  reading a text as nothing more than a text risks grave misunderstandings 
that could prove embarrassing to the borrowing court.”). 
32
 See, e.g., Clark B. Lombardi & Nathan J. Brown, Do Constitutions Requiring 
Adherence to Shari‘a Threaten Human Rights?: How Egypt’s Constitutional Court Reconciles 
Islamic Law with the Liberal Rule of Law, 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 379, 411–12 (2006).  See 
also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 633 (2006) (“Like the phrase ‘regularly constituted 
court,’ [widely accepted judicial guarantees are] not defined in the text of the Geneva 
Conventions but must be understood to incorporate at least the barest of those trial protections 
that have been recognized by customary international law.”); Sam Foster Halabi, The World 
Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: An Analysis of Guidelines 
Adopted by the Conference of the Parties, 39 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 121 (2010) (describing 
the Bangalore Principles by which common law judges use principles of international law to 
fill in gaps in national law); Sam Foster Halabi, The Supremacy Clause as Structural 
Safeguard of Federalism: State Judges and International Law in the Post-Erie Era, 23 DUKE J. 
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courts do engage with foreign law in the ways described by prominent 
comparative law scholars, they also appear to be forging a body of judge-made 
law which relies upon mutual reference for legitimacy.
33
   
In D.K. Basu, Justice A.S. Anand of India and Justice Michael Hardie 
Boys of New Zealand appear to complete a jurisprudential cycle whereby one 
judge establishes a right or set of rights which is then authorized by a second 
judicial body whose decision is then recycled back as authority in the original 
issuing court (and, in the case of D.K. Basu, by the same authoring judge).  
Given courts’ “central role in legitimizing and validating the exercise of public 
power” and their “obligation to engage in a process of justification for their 
own decisions” it is important to understand whether they are acting in a 
national or transnational capacity.
34
   
The concern among critics of constitutional borrowing has been that 
judges will “cherry pick” foreign precedent to lead to a preferred outcome in a 
given case.  What scholars have paid less attention to is that a judge may use 
foreign precedent as part of building a global body of legal authority 
supporting not only mutual recognition of interpretive principles but also 
structural authority like the remedial powers that national courts enjoy relative 
to national legislatures or sub-national actors, such as provinces or states.  This 
possibility is not well-accommodated by existing theories articulated by legal 
scholars, but it contributes to the effort undertaken by political scientists to 
understand the exercise of the judicial power as part of a competitive 
institutional dynamic among legislative, executive, and judicial authorities. 
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows:  Part II reviews 
existing theories and terminology describing theories of comparative 
constitutional interpretation, briefly summarizing their features and use in 
constitutional court reasoning.  Part III presents the factual and procedural 
background of D.K. Basu, sketching the prevalence of death and torture in 
police detention, the relevant Indian custody jurisprudence, and the use made 
by the Court of precedents and reasoning from foreign jurisdictions.  Part IV 
more thoroughly develops comparative constitutional theory as applied to the 
case of D.K. Basu, weighing the relevant theories and assessing whether those 
theories usefully describe the Court’s borrowing behavior.  Part V presents the 
                                                                                                                                                  
COMP. & INT’L L. 63 (2012) (noting judicial conferencing recommended under the Hague 
Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A 
Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99 (1994) (discussing 
alternative forms of transnational judicial dialogue and the importance of such dialogue to the 
judiciary as an institution.  Justice Anand’s judgment in D.K. Basu is a good example of the 
latter.).   
33
 As many scholars have argued, the relationship between courts and executives or 
legislatures need not be absolute.  Courts may engage in “dialogic” judicial review, for 
example, inviting executive or legislative action through their decisions.  See Rosalind Dixon, 
The Supreme Court of Canada, Charter Dialogue, and Deference, 47 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 235, 
238–39 (2009). 
34
 Choudhry, supra note 6, at 885. 
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conclusions of the case that may aid in our understanding of the complex use 
that constitutional courts make of foreign judgments and reasoning. 
II. THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION: UNIVERSALISM, EXPRESSIVISM, AND PRAGMATISM 
 
The field of comparative constitutional law has not yet developed a 
standardized terminology for descriptions of what courts do when they borrow 
or refer to foreign precedent.  For example, in his seminal exploration of the 
field, Mark Tushnet referred to “functionalism”, “expressivism”, and 
“bricolage” to describe the comparative constitutional adjudicative process.35  
Functionalist approaches to constitutional comparativism acknowledge that 
certain constitutional provisions are meant to secure a particular form of 
governance, and judges are able to discover which constitutional provisions 
serve those underlying purposes through comparison and contrast between 
constitutional structures.  “Expressivism” describes comparisons undertaken to 
ascertain the extent to which constitutions represent underlying national 
cultures and experiences and how those experiences manifest through 
constitutional interpretation.
36
  “Bricolage” posits that constitutions are often 
assembled from borrowed ideas that, in turn, justify reference to those 
borrowed ideas as a constitutional experience unfolds.
37
    
Sujit Choudhry contemporaneously offered a comprehensive 
classification scheme for judicial borrowing, referring to “universal”, 
“dialogical”, and “genealogical” interpretation.38  “Universalism” refers to the 
effort by jurists to discover broadly applicable principles underlying 
constitutional concepts, such as the state’s ability to deprive a citizen of his or 
her liberty or life.
39
  “Dialogical” interpretation is used to explore 
                                                        
35
 Sujit Choudhry, Migration as a New Metaphor in Comparative Constitutional Law, in 
THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 1, 22–26 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006); Choudhry, 
supra note 6, at 835–38; Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional 
Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225 (1999).  
36
 Tushnet, supra note 35, at 1276–78.  Tushnet cites American tolerance of hate speech as 
traceable to a constitutional commitment to “the principle that debate on public issues should 
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” where other national experiences, Germany’s, for 
example, justify greater flexibility for law-makers to restrict speech aimed at inciting ethnic or 
religious hatred.  Id. at 1276 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).  
37
 Id. at 1285–87.  See also Margit Cohn, Legal Transplant Chronicles: The Evolution of 
Unreasonableness and Proportionality Review of the Administration in the United Kingdom, 
58 AM. J. COMP. L. 583, 595 n.40 (2010) (citing Tushnet, supra note 35) (performing “analysis 
of the viability of constitutional transplants; attitudes including functionalism (consideration of 
suitability of the adoption of a rule through the assessment of the functions its [sic] fills in the 
home system and the parallel functions in the receiving system), expressivism (careful 
treatment of constitutions, being expressions of national credos), and bricolage (assembly of 
any available rule, essentially undiscriminately)”). 
38
 See Choudhry, supra note 6. 
39
 Id. at 833. 
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constitutional differences of significant, if not universal, import.
40
  For 
example, the use of race-based criteria for employment or university 
admissions plays a unique constitutional role in both the United States and 
South Africa given the relationship between their historical experiences and 
constitutional provisions regarding equality and due process.
41
  “Dialogical” 
comparative constitutionalism allows judges in these jurisdictions and others to 
examine how their particular experience does or should shape the 
constitutional rights of individuals or the validity of public law measures aimed 
at addressing past inequities.  “Genealogical” forms of comparative 
constitutional adjudication examine constitutional provisions in light of their 
source.
42
  For Choudhry, this matters because many constitutions, especially 
those drafted under or influenced by British colonial institutions, contain 
provisions reflecting at least one and often many more constitutional 
experiences.
43
   
In her comprehensive treatment of comparative constitutional 
jurisprudence, Vicki Jackson similarly classified constitutional borrowing into 
a spectrum comprised of “convergence”, “resistance”, and “engagement.” 44  
Like Choudhry’s universalism, Jackson’s “convergence” occurs when one 
constitutional court adopts another constitutional court’s interpretation or 
reasoning based either 1) on the relationship between a greater number of 
courts adopting it and the chance that it is correct or 2) on its consistency with 
international legal norms embodied in, for example, international human rights 
instruments.  Courts resist foreign precedent because reference to other 
constitutional courts threatens the cultural or national distinctiveness embodied 
in a constitution, undermines certain interpretive theories like originalism and 
textualism, and compounds the already existing democratic tension inherent in 
the power of judicial review.
45
  “Engagement”, which essentially covers 
possibilities between convergence and resistance, is “founded on commitments 
to judicial deliberation and open to the possibilities of either harmony or 
dissonance between national self-understandings and transnational norms.”46   
                                                        
40
 Id. at 835–36. 
41
 Id. at 836 n.70. 
42
 Id. at 838. 
43
 See id. at 838 n.81. 
44
 JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT, supra note 1, at 17–23. 
45
 Id. 
46
 Id. at 9.  “Sujit Choudhry’s ‘dialogical’ stance corresponds to Jackson's ‘engagement’” 
and “analysis of possible approaches to the reception of foreign law.”  Cohn, supra note 37, at 
595 n.40 (citing JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT, supra note 1; Choudhry, supra 
note 6, at 835–38; Choudhry, supra note 35, at 1, 22–26).  “Attitudes includ[e] convergence 
(adoption, based on the assumption of the desirability of convergence with, if not incorporation 
of, foreign and international norms); resistance (rejection, expressed for example in American 
exceptionalism); and engagement (a practice of informed consideration prior to possible 
adoption, under which transnational law is considered a possible, but not controlling, form of 
legal development).”  Cohn, supra note 37, at 595 n.40 (citing JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
ENGAGEMENT, supra note 1).  See also Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: 
Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005).   
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Roger Alford contextualizes comparative constitutional adjudication 
through underlying interpretive theories—originalism, natural law, 
majoritarianism, and pragmatism—which similarly categorize judges’ use of 
foreign precedent in constitutional cases.
47
  Alford evaluates the relative merit 
of constitutional borrowing through these interpretive theories although they 
similarly reflect concepts embodied in Choudhry’s “universalism” (natural 
law), Jackson’s “resistance” (originalism), and Tushnet’s “functionalism” and 
“bricolage” (pragmatism). There are, of course, other classifying schemes, 
each of which emphasizes certain normative or empirical problems that 
accompany the study of courts’ use of foreign precedent.  Taavi Annus 
summarized the state of the field this way: 
 
Attempts to categorize uses of comparative law by courts are 
numerous.  Although most authors claim that there are three 
uses of comparative constitutional law, there is a general lack of 
coherency among these classifications.  For 
example, Tushnet discusses functionalism, expressivism, and 
bricolage.  Choudhry contends that there are three modes of 
comparative constitutional interpretation:  universalist, 
dialogical, and genealogical. . . .  Another way of seeing the use 
of comparative law is to differentiate between defining and 
justifying relevant issues and clarifying the reasoning behind 
comparative analysis in moral and policy balancing.  One can 
refer to ‘evaluative,’ ‘intentionalist,’ ‘textualist,’ and ‘authority-
based’ comparisons.  One might also distinguish between 
‘necessary’ and voluntary,’ between genealogical’ and 
‘ahistorical,’ and between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ recourses to 
comparative law. . . .  The court may use comparative law in 
order to ‘find a solution’ or ‘justify a solution,’ as well as for 
the purpose of ‘internal utility’ or ‘external legitimacy.’  The 
comparison may be ‘vertical’ or ‘horizontal.’  Alternatively, one 
might distinguish between the ‘general and indirect,’ as opposed 
to ‘specific and direct,’ influence of comparative constitutional 
materials, as well as between explicit and non-explicit uses of 
comparative constitutional law.
48
 
 
As this passage hints, the field of comparative constitutional law is tilted 
toward the classificatory.  Courts borrow or resist borrowing in one of several 
“modes”, “postures”, or “methods.”  Use of foreign materials is similarly 
ascribed to the nature or function of the original source or the parallel 
structures or principles to which they are applied.   
Describing with accuracy the constitutional borrowing phenomena is an 
important part of understanding judicial behavior as the “global community of 
                                                        
47
 Alford, supra note 4. 
48
 Annus, supra note 5, at 307–08 (citations omitted). 
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courts” grows more tightly knit.49  But the more fundamental relationship at 
stake in the comparative constitutional law debate is the relationship between 
judicial power and democratic legitimacy.   
Indeed, the fundamental controversy, as Alford, Jackson, Tushnet, 
Choudhry, and, it is fair to say, most scholars who have weighed in on the 
debate have identified, is whether resort to comparative constitutional 
precedent is consistent with republican democratic principles.  This is the 
distinction that Mary Ann Glendon draws, for example, in claiming that use of 
foreign precedent is legitimate where it is used to affirm executive or 
legislative measures but not legitimate where it is used to invalidate them.
50
  
The question is whether, as proponents argue, comparative constitutional 
jurisprudence provides yet another body of persuasive authority that poses no 
more of a threat than a court’s use of a law review article or whether, as critics 
argue, constitutional borrowing has fundamental institutional consequences 
that are inconsistent with conventional notions of democracy.
51
   
Comprehensive surveys of foreign borrowing and descriptive 
classification are less likely to focus on that question than analyzing whether 
any given episode of borrowing enhances judicial authority.  In order to 
explore this latter question, I searched for a case in which a constitutional court 
applied numerous sources of foreign constitutional precedent to support a wide 
range of constitutional conclusions, both to explore the robustness of existing 
classifications as well as to explore whether constitutional borrowing presents 
independent manifestations of the “countermajoritarian difficulty.”52  At the 
risk of oversimplifying these theories, I have labeled them “universalism”, 
“expressivism”, and “pragmatism”, folding in Jackson’s “convergence” with 
Choudhry’s “universalism”, similarly using Tushnet’s “expressivism” to 
encompass Jackson’s “engagement” and “resistance” and Choudhry’s 
“genealogical” and “dialogical” modes, and “pragmatism” to include Tushnet’s 
“bricolage.”   
                                                        
49
 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 191, 192 
(2003). 
50
 Mary Ann Glendon, Judicial Tourism: What’s Wrong with the U.S. Supreme Court 
Citing Foreign Law, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2005, at A14. 
51
 H. Patrick Glenn, Persuasive Authority, 32 MCGILL L.J. 261, 263 (1987). 
52
 Methodologically, the benefits and disadvantages of the case study are well-known.  
The case study provides a useful object to apply ideas and methods that have developed 
through other theoretical and empirical work.  It is most useful when the line is not clearly 
evident between the phenomena being studied—in this case, constitutional borrowing—and 
the context in which that phenomena occurs, the judicial interpretation.  The case study, 
however, cannot establish conclusions that are general or reliable.  Notwithstanding these 
limitations, case studies are abundant in social and natural sciences literature and remain 
central to business, public policy, and the related form of the case method in legal education in 
the United States.  See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Teaching Civil Procedure Through Its Top 
Ten Cases, Plus or Minus Two, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 111, 115–17 (2003) (summarizing the 
case method in legal education); Joseph W. Rand, Understanding Why Good Lawyers Go Bad: 
Using Case Studies in Teaching Cognitive Bias in Legal Decision-Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 
731, 754–57 (2003) (discussing the usefulness of case studies as a vehicle for analyzing legal 
problems). 
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A. Universalist Interpretation 
 
Constitutional courts invoke “universalism” when their decisions assert 
that constitutional rights are cut from a universal cloth of rights and 
obligations.
53
  Constitutional courts are “engaged in the identification, 
interpretation, and application of the same set of principles.”54  The exact legal 
structures and procedures may differ, but most legal systems nevertheless share 
underlying principles.  And constitutional courts are particularly suited to 
secure those principles to all citizens.
55
  “[E]very legal system in the world is 
open to the same questions and subject to the same standards, so that when 
systems do differ, it is often the result of historical accident or temporary or 
contingent circumstances.”56  Because constitutions and their highest 
interpretive bodies face problems common to all societies, those societies may, 
at the very least, develop a common vocabulary and set of theoretical 
concepts.
57
  Roger Alford analogizes universalism to the natural law tradition 
in which principles of equality, justice, and liberty are ultimately traceable to a 
limited number of divine virtues.
58
 
Recent scholarly discussions have focused on the use of universalist 
interpretation in cases involving the extent of the state’s ability to punish 
crimes by depriving citizens of their lives.
59
  Universalist interpretation uses 
the reasoning and precedent of foreign jurisdictions in order to identify norms 
and principles operating in constitutional republics, viewing those precedents 
                                                        
53
 See Miguel González Marcos, Comparative Law at the Service of Democracy: A 
Reading of Arosemana’s Constitutional Studies of the Latin American Governments, 21 B.U. 
INT’L L.J. 259, 317 (2003).  The debate about whether there can or should be a universal human 
code remains heated, although it is assumed for purposes of this argument that a set of 
universal human values is realizable and desirable.  See Rushworth M. Kidder, Universal 
Human Values: Finding an Ethical Common Ground, FUTURIST, July–Aug. 1994, at 8, 8–13.   
54
 Choudhry, supra note 6, at 833. 
55
 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 45–86 (1986). 
56
 Choudhry, supra note 6, at 834. 
57
 Id.   
58
 Alford, supra note 4, at 663 (“As late as 1829 the Court could declare the natural 
law pronouncement that ‘[t]he fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require, that 
the rights of personal liberty and private property should be held sacred.’”) (citing Wilkinson 
v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 657 (1829)). 
59
 See EDWARD J. EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY: CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS IN 
GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES (2002) (referring to the interpretation of, for example, 
dignity, in courts in countries like Germany, Israel, and South Africa, which have 
simultaneously claimed that such a right is universal while reaching different conclusions as to 
its meaning and breadth); Dixon, supra note 3, at 951; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “A Decent 
Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in 
Constitutional Adjudication, 26 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 187, 195 (2007).  The degree of 
“universalism” is highly dependent on the description and nature of the right at issue.  Baruch 
Bracha, Constitutional Upgrading of Human Rights in Israel: The Impact on Administrative 
Law, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 581 (2001); Lombardi & Brown, supra note 32, at 420.  
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as evidence of deeper currents of a universal rule of law.
60
  In Ferreira v. 
Levin, South Africa’s Justice Ackermann summarized comparative 
interpretation as exploring “our own common law as well as the common law 
in other jurisdictions . . . . in the context of an ‘open and democratic society 
based on freedom and equality’ . . . ‘to promote the values which underlie’ 
precisely such a society.”61  In these cases, reflective of a much larger body of 
comparative decisions, judges openly attempt to “discover” the features of a 
universal, common set of citizens’ rights.62 
Universalism enjoys positive as well as normative justifications.  
According to Jeremy Waldron, judges relying on foreign precedent may, 
through an iterative process, achieve a consensus, or some version of 
uniformity on fundamental principles or interpretations of those principles.
63
  
The greater the degree of agreement, the more likely the grounds of agreement 
are to be correct or at least deserving of substantial consideration.  Striking 
down the juvenile death penalty in the United States, the U.S. Supreme Court, 
speaking through Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, invoked the practice of 
examining “the laws of other countries and to international authorities as 
instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of 
‘cruel and unusual punishments.’”64  In their historical analysis of U.S. 
Supreme Court reference to foreign law, Steven Calabresi and Stephanie 
Zimdahl
 
argue that this utilitarian approach has subtly underscored decades of 
American constitutional interpretation.
65
  U.S. Supreme Court justices refer to 
                                                        
60
 As Jackson notes, sometimes these uses are explicitly or implicitly invited.  Jackson, 
Transnational Discourse, supra note 4, at 290–92 (citations omitted) (“Some constitutions 
specifically or implicitly authorize consideration of foreign or international law in the 
resolution of constitutional rights questions.  The South African Constitution specifically 
provides that ‘[W]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court . . . must consider international 
law; and . . . may consider foreign law,’ and the South African Court has done both on a 
number of occasions.  The Constitutional Court has repeatedly held that the constitutional 
mandate to consider international human rights law ‘would include nonbinding as well as 
binding law,’ an interpretation by no means obvious though apparently accepted as correct.  In 
addition to provisions specifically authorizing the consideration of foreign law, clauses like 
Canadian Charter Section 1, permitting only those limitations of rights demonstrably justified 
in a ‘free and democratic’ society, implicitly invite consideration of the practices of other 
democratic nations.  Similar language is found in some provisions of the ICCPR and of the 
regional human rights conventions.”). 
61
 Ferreira v. Levin & Others 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) at 111 para. 91 (S. Afr.) (emphasis 
added) (footnote omitted). 
62
 Amnon Reichman, The Passionate Expression of Hate: Constitutional Protections, 
Emotional Harm and Comparative Law, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 76, 136 (2007); Kai 
Schadbach, The Benefits of Comparative Law: A Continental European View, 16 B.U. INT’L 
L.J. 331, 420–21 (1998). 
63
 See Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
129 (2005). 
64
 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005). 
65
 Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign 
Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (2005). 
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foreign law to confirm their reasoning based initially and principally on the 
U.S. Constitution and prior Court precedent. 
 
B. Expressivist Interpretation 
 
Expressivist comparative constitutional law does not expound 
“universal” values underlying legal systems.  Examination of foreign 
jurisprudence may nevertheless provide a useful source by which to criticize, 
evaluate, and more fully understand one country’s own legal system.66  This 
“dialogical” or “expressive” use of comparative jurisprudence “exposes the 
practices of one’s own legal system as contingent and circumstantial, not 
transcendent and timeless.”67  Comparing legal systems and rules, 
constitutional adjudicators may not discover universal values like those of the 
“open and democratic society” but will nevertheless discover the essential 
underpinnings of their own constitutional framework and, subsequently, more 
effectively decide crucial constitutional questions in light of that 
understanding.
68
  Expressive interpretation is used more frequently and applies 
to a broader set of rights than “universalist” interpretation including 
affirmative action, copyright, and the right to education or health.
69
   
 
 
1. Expressivism and the Constitutional Reflection of 
Culture 
 
U.S., Canadian, and European constitutional courts, for example, have 
engaged in expressive interpretation to reach varying conclusions as to the 
protections that individuals enjoy as to free speech and expression.  Consider 
the example of hate speech.  In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down as 
unconstitutional the following Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance passed by the 
city of St. Paul, Minnesota: 
 
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, 
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not 
                                                        
66
 See also Annus, supra note 5, at 314 (alternatively referring to dialogical interpretation 
as the “soft use of comparative experience”). 
67
 Choudhry, supra note 6, at 836. 
68
 See Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J. INT’L 
L. 409, 424–27, 437–39 (2003); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 1103 (2000) (discussing the emergence of a global legal community through judicial 
dialogue).  But see McCrudden, supra note 7 (expressing skepticism about the value of 
transnational discussions or comparative reasoning in the area of human rights).    
69
 See Annus, supra note 5, at 305 (citations omitted) (“A third [area of comparative 
constitutional law] focuses on substantive constitutional law issues, and compares approaches 
by different countries, or otherwise reviews the solutions of one country from an ‘outsider’ 
perspective or for an outside reader.  Such issues are very diverse, and have ranged from free 
speech to affirmative action.”).  See also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
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limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows 
or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or 
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion 
or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor.
70
   
 
St. Paul convicted a teenager, R.A.V., after he burned a cross on the 
lawn of an African-American family.  The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld 
the conviction on the basis that burning the cross incited violent behavior 
within the scope of a long-established exception to the free speech protections 
afforded by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
71
  The U.S. 
Supreme Court disagreed and determined that the ordinance violated the First 
Amendment because the breadth of the ordinance might prohibit “otherwise 
permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses.”72  In 
other words, the American right to free expression was to be largely free of 
government interference—any hint that protected free speech may be 
endangered was sufficient to invalidate government regulation.  The St. Paul 
decision became the paradigmatic case of the American approach to free 
speech—fear that the state was given too much discretion dominated the 
Court’s analysis.73  
Relying in part and distinguishing in part the reasoning of the U.S. 
Supreme Court in R.A.V. v. St. Paul,
74
 the Supreme Court of Canada reached a 
different conclusion as to protected speech.  In R. v. Keegstra, the Supreme 
Court of Canada upheld the conviction of James Keegstra for violating the 
“Hate Propaganda” provision of the Canadian Criminal Code, which 
prohibited communications that “willfully promote[] hatred against any 
identifiable group . . . .”75  An Alberta trial court convicted Keegstra, a high 
school teacher, based on his teachings attributing “various evil qualities to 
Jews.”76  After reviewing the “reasonable limits” imposed on the rights and 
freedoms contained in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the 
Supreme Court of Canada addressed “a . . . crucial [matter] to the disposition 
of this appeal:  the relationship between Canadian and American approaches to 
the constitutional protection of free expression, most notably in the realm of 
hate propaganda.”77  Ultimately concluding that “Canada’s constitutional 
vision depart from that endorsed in the United States,”78 the Supreme Court of 
                                                        
70
 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992). 
71
 The “fighting words” exception was established in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 
U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
72
 St. Paul, 505 U.S. at 381. 
73
 Blake D. Morant, Electoral Integrity: Media, Democracy, and the Value of Self-
Restraint, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1, 27 (2003). 
74
 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
75
 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, C-46, § 319(2) (Can.). 
76
 R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.). 
77
 Id. 
78
 Id. 
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Canada nevertheless cited U.S. Supreme Court decisions as “evidence of a 
recognition that content discrimination is sometimes accepted.”79  The decision 
made extensive use of expressive interpretation—the justices explored not only 
similarities but differences with American constitutional law in sharpening the 
Canadian experience with free speech and the wider berth given to Canadian 
provincial governments to regulate it. 
Similarly, Judge Bonello of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) concurred in Ceylan v. Turkey
80
 but rejected the test favored by the 
ECHR in favor of the standard set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Schenck 
v. United States.
81
  Munir Ceylan was a Turkish national who, while president 
of the petroleum workers’ union (Petrol-İş Sendikasi), wrote an article entitled 
“The Time Has Come for the Workers to Speak Out—Tomorrow It Will Be 
Too Late” in the July 21–28, 1991, issue of Yeni Ülke (New Land), a weekly 
newspaper published in Istanbul.
82
  The Turkish government brought a 
criminal action against Ceylan in the Istanbul National Security Court resulting 
in his conviction under Article 312, sections 2 and 3 of the Turkish Criminal 
Code for inciting the people to hostility and hatred by making distinctions 
based on ethnic or regional origin or social class.
83
  He was sentenced to one 
year and eight months’ imprisonment and a substantial fine.84  The European 
Court of Human Rights determined that the “pluralism, tolerance and 
broadmindedness” of a democratic society required freedom of expression, as 
did an individual’s self-fulfillment.85  Any exceptions to such freedom must be 
strictly construed, and political speech was particularly protected unless such 
speech were “incite[ment] to violence.”86  Judge Bonello, regarding the 
Court’s formulation as insufficiently broad, argued instead for an imminence 
requirement—by and large the only distinction between the European Court of 
Human Rights formulation and the American one.
87
  
 In these expressive experiences, courts sharpen constitutional 
similarities and differences in the context of a given cultural, political, and 
                                                        
79
 Roy Leeper, Keegstra and R.A.V.: A Comparative Analysis of the Canadian and U.S. 
Approaches to Hate Speech Legislation, 5 COMM. L. & POL’Y 295, 306 n.76 (2000) (citing 
Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. at 742; Posadas de P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986) 
(commercial speech); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985) 
(political speech); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (child pornography); Roth v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity)). 
80
 Ceylan v. Turkey, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 73 (1999). 
81
 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
82
 Ceylan, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 73, ¶ 8. 
83
 Id. ¶¶ 9–11. 
84
 Id. ¶ 11. 
85
 Id. ¶ 32(i). 
86
 Id. ¶ 34. 
87
 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 
376 (1927); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 
U.S. 47, 52 (1919).  
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economic context.
88
  The expansive reach of free speech in the United States is 
deemed too broad in the Canadian context and misformulated in the European 
context, which emphasizes free speech as a positive right needed for self-
fulfillment.  Discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in New York Times 
v. Sullivan,
89
 the South African Constitutional Court refused to  adopt 
“horizontal application”—that private parties may invoke constitutional 
protections in their private law disputes—because of the important appellate 
“division of labor” established by South African Constitutional framers.90  The 
expressive mode emphasizes “constitutional difference . . . .  [A] constitution is 
only unique by comparison to other constitutions that share some feature or 
characteristic which that constitution does not.”91 
 
2. Expressivism as Divergence from Sibling Constitutional 
Traditions 
 
Historical relationships and adopted legal structures and traditions can 
“offer sufficient justification to import and apply entire areas of constitutional 
doctrine.”92  “Constitutions tied together by genealogy are related either like 
parent and child, or like siblings who have emerged from the same parent legal 
system.”93  Borrowing constitutional jurisprudence from “sibling” legal 
systems takes as its starting point a shared set of moral-political values, which, 
in turn, can borrow from one another legitimately.
94
  This kind of borrowing 
takes as its approximate parallel Burkean traditionalism, in which long-
standing, common norms and practices justify sisterhood of legal and political 
systems, even without concerted efforts to guard those legal systems from 
internal or external challenges.
95
 
                                                        
88
 Cheryl Saunders, The Use and Misuse of Comparative Constitutional Law, 13 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37 (2006) (exploring the limitations and possibilities of comparative 
constitutional adjudication in the Australian context). 
89
 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
90
 Du Plessis v. De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) at 42 para. 57 (S. Afr.) (Kentridge, Acting 
J.) (“The consequence would be that appeals in all [horizontal application] cases would lie to 
the Constitutional Court, and the Appellate Division would be deprived of a substantial part of 
what has hitherto been its regular civil jurisdiction.”).   
91
 Choudhry, supra note 6, at 856. 
92
 Id. at 838. 
93
 Id. 
94
 See Herman Schwartz, The Internationalization of Constitutional Law, 10 HUM. RTS. 
BRIEF 10 (2003) (arguing that the phenomenon is least developed in the United States, where it 
faces significant opposition); Shawn E. Fields, Note, Constitutional Comparativism and the 
Eighth Amendment: How a Flawed Proportionality Requirement Can Benefit from Foreign 
Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 963, 995–97 (2006). See also Rex D. Glensy, Which Countries Count?: 
Lawrence v. Texas and the Selection of Foreign Persuasive Authority, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 357, 
439 (2005). 
95
 See Jennifer M. Welsh, Edmund Burke and the Commonwealth of Europe: The Cultural 
Bases of International Order, in CLASSICAL THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 173, 
173–92 (Ian Clark & Iver B. Neumann eds., 1996). 
91 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 2013 
 91  
American courts regularly refer to British jurisprudence to interpret the 
U.S. Constitution on the basis that the U.S. Constitution originated out of the 
unique relationship between England and the American colonies immediately 
before U.S. independence.  In Loving v. United States, U.S. Army private 
Dwight Loving was sentenced to death for murdering two taxicab drivers.
96
  
Loving challenged his sentence on the basis that the President did not have the 
power to prescribe aggravating factors, a power solely within Congress’s 
purview.
97
  Relying on English legal history, Justice Kennedy argued that in 
order to understand the power of Congress and the President in the context of 
courts-martial, the U.S. Supreme Court must examine the comparative 
constitutional law of England because of the relevance of Parliamentary 
attempts to regulate military tribunals.
98
  Similarly, in District of Columbia v. 
Heller, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the Second Amendment 
protected an individual’s right to bear arms, largely through reference to the 
development of English law.
99
  
Canadian judges have consistently looked to the practice of U.S. courts 
with respect to the treatment of Native Americans.  The common British 
ancestry of the American and Canadian dealings with indigenous peoples and 
the elaboration of those principles by Chief Justice John Marshall “is prima 
facie relevant to the interpretation of the Canadian Constitution, in particular 
Section 35(1)’s . . . affirmation of existing aboriginal rights; indeed, those 
principles ‘are as relevant to Canada as they are to the United States.’”100  
While common law and doctrines may shift, expressive interpretation 
legitimizes the use of sibling legal doctrine as a source of constitutional 
interpretation.
101
 
 
C. Pragmatist Interpretation 
 
Courts engage in pragmatic borrowing to find “possible solutions to 
similar problems at home.”102  Pragmatism therefore does not require, nor is it 
generally affected by, incongruity between the national cultures or 
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constitutional structures informing the foreign law that is borrowed.  In Printz 
v. United States,
103
 Justice Breyer, in his dissent, urged the Court to examine 
the experiences of other federal political entities—Switzerland, Germany, and 
the European Union—to inform whether local enforcement of federal gun 
regulation better advanced the objective embodied in the Tenth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution—namely, that the federal government’s law-
making powers intrude to the least extent possible on local law-making and 
enforcement prerogatives.
104
  Acknowledging that “there may be relevant 
political and structural differences between their systems and our own,” Justice 
Breyer nevertheless suggested that the establishment of a federal gun control 
bureaucracy to enforce the Brady Act imposed greater impediments to “state 
sovereignty or individual liberty” than Congress’s fairly modest requirement 
for state officials to use “reasonable efforts” to implement the law.105  Justice 
Breyer did not suggest that central commandeering of local officials to enforce 
federal law was, in general, a necessary feature of constitutional, federal 
republicanism (universalism) nor did he suggest that any fundamental aspect of 
the U.S. Constitution required the Court to invalidate Congress’s allocation of 
enforcement authority to state police (expressivism).  Indeed, what he 
proposed was a practical way to think through the problem posed by a law that 
flowed from one of Congress’s enumerated powers with an aspect of 
enforcement that, in his view, better balanced the federal-state balance 
embodied in the Tenth Amendment than outright rejection.   
 In Miranda v. Arizona,
106
 the U.S. Supreme Court determined that 
custodial interrogations of criminal defendants were inherently coercive and 
that this compulsion was in tension with the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on 
self-incrimination.
107
  The Court imposed procedural requirements on police—
to inform subjects of custodial interrogation that they could remain silent, that 
statements would be used as evidence against them, that they had a right to 
counsel, and, if indigent, then counsel would be appointed—as part of a 
judicially-fashioned remedy critical to the preservation of citizens’ Fifth 
Amendment rights.
108
  The Court reviewed the law of coerced confessions 
from England, Scotland, India, and Sri Lanka,
109
 which imposed varying levels 
of protections to those in police custody.
110
  Noting that India’s Constitution 
provided a similarly worded prohibition on self-incrimination, the Court 
observed that confessions made to police officers were inadmissible in 
criminal proceedings as substantive evidence against the accused, and 
“confessions made to others while in police custody must be made in the 
                                                        
103
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immediate presence of a magistrate” to be admissible.111  Chief Justice Warren 
noted that the Supreme Court of India had imposed an additional twenty-four-
hour period between arrest and any confession to ensure time for the defendant 
to deliberate on the confession.
112
  Although the Court referenced foreign law 
principally for the purpose of showing that court-imposed procedures would 
not overburden police, the U.S. Supreme Court opted for procedural 
requirements closely mirroring those used in England at the time.
113
   
There is, of course, no textual basis for the Miranda protections in the 
Fifth Amendment, and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach 
until formal criminal adversarial proceedings commence.
114
  Rather, the Court 
struggled with the formation of a judicially administrable remedy given the 
constitutional problem it had identified.  The Miranda warnings, as we now 
know them, were not the Court’s only option.  The Court could have imposed 
an absolute prohibition on the use of statements made in police custody as 
evidence against a criminal defendant, consistent with practice in India.  
Constitutional borrowing allowed the Court to survey a range of possible 
remedies and identify those that balanced the value of statements made in 
police custody as evidence and prosecution of crime with the “inherently 
coercive” nature of custodial interrogations.  Again, this choice was made 
despite important structural and cultural differences between borrowing and 
donating courts. 
III. SHRI D.K. BASU V. STATE OF WEST BENGAL 
 
 While it inherited British language, political institutions, and, to some 
extent, culture as a result of Britain’s long colonial presence, India separated 
from the United Kingdom contemporaneously with, and influenced in 
significant part by, the codification of universal human rights that had slowly 
grown in number and detail over the course of the nineteenth century.  The 
Constitution of India reflected parliamentary norms under which British 
democracy worked but adopted American principles of separation of powers 
including a co-equal supreme court.
115
  It chose Australian and Canadian 
principles of federalism to distribute sovereignty between the national and state 
governments.
116
  Because of this history, Indian judges have long been 
comfortable with constitutional borrowing.
 117
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A. Factual and Procedural Posture 
 
 India’s geography and history have magnified the tensions nearly every 
state experiences in balancing the role of securing order and geopolitical 
security with the realization of at least a minimum core of citizens’ rights.118  
At the time of its break with Britain, Indian citizens had suffered from long-
standing and abusively deployed emergency laws passed and then 
implemented with increasing severity as the independence movement gathered 
momentum.
119
  The drafters of the Constitution of India sought to include 
fundamental protections against the kinds of officially sanctioned abuses 
prevalent under the British.
120
  Yet India was born into an extraordinarily 
precarious security situation, surrounded along much of its land border by 
actively hostile or latently antagonistic states that sponsored individual acts of 
violence within both disputed and undisputed Indian territory.  Internally, the 
state persistently faced insurrections based on caste disparity or tribal identity.  
According to Anil Kalhan: 
 
India’s decades-long struggle to combat politicized violence has 
created what one observer has termed a ‘chronic crisis of 
national security’ that has become part of the very ‘essence of 
[India’s] being.’  Thousands have been killed and injured in this 
violence, whether terrorist, insurgent, or communal, and in the 
subsequent responses of security forces.
121
   
 
The Constitution of India, while guaranteeing fundamental rights, such 
as speech, expression, assembly, association, and free movement, as well as 
rights upon arrest, such as access to counsel, allows Parliament flexibility to 
curtail those rights in the interests of the “sovereignty and integrity of India,” 
the security of the state, or public order.
122
  In periods of declared emergency, 
those rights may be suspended altogether.
123
  As a special report from the 
Committee on International Human Rights of the Association of the Bar of the 
City of New York documented, many of the “exceptional” and emergency 
measures put in place by the British have been reincorporated in laws and 
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police procedures governing the rights of citizens in police custody.
124
  Indian 
states, which enjoy general control over criminal investigation and 
prosecution,
125
 continue to use these regulations against criminals, rebels, and 
innocent parties.
126
  The human cost of these regulations has been severe.   
India’s principal security entanglements have involved Pakistan, from 
which it violently separated in 1947.
127
  Between 1947 and 1971, Pakistan also 
ruled the province of East Pakistan, which bordered the Indian province of 
West Bengal.
128
  East Pakistan, separated from Pakistan by the entire state of 
India, suffered economic, linguistic, and political marginalization.
129
  In 1970, 
East Pakistan’s largest political party, the Awami League, won a sufficient 
number of seats in national elections to form a government for West and East 
Pakistan.
130
  West Pakistani military and political elites refused to allow the 
League to do so and, combined with a lethargic response to a deadly cyclone in 
East Pakistan in the same year, led to a war for independence.
131
  The war 
began in March 1971 and lasted through December, when India intervened on 
behalf of East Pakistan.
132
  East Pakistan became Bangladesh upon 
independence.   
The conflict sent millions across the border into the Indian state of 
West Bengal, exacerbating the security problems for a state already struggling 
with an indigenous movement to violently force the redistribution of property 
to historically marginalized groups.
133
  Through 1974, the Indian state of West 
Bengal detained 15,000 to 20,000 people without trial, some for five years or 
more; eighty-eight died in police custody.
134
  D.K. Basu, Executive Chairman 
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of Legal Aid Services of West Bengal, sent a letter to the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court after several deaths in 1986 and recommended that the Court 
“develop ‘custody jurisprudence’” and “formulate modalities for awarding 
compensation.”135   
The judiciary in India is comprised of an integrated court system that 
administers justice for both the federal government and the states.  In this 
integrated court system, the Supreme Court of India is the highest and final 
court of appeal.  The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction on issues of the 
enforcement of civil and human rights.
136
  The Court treated D.K. Basu’s letter 
as a “writ petition” invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction;137 another letter 
followed from the Aligarh province detailing a death in police custody.
138
  
Taking notice of widespread allegations in all states, and the challenge of the 
“national” issue of custody abuse and death, the Court issued notices to “all the 
State Governments to find out whether they . . . desire[d] to say anything in the 
matter.”139  While many states responded with, in the Court’s view, 
unsatisfactory reassurances of procedures and safeguards, some contributed 
specific recommendations, as did the Law Commission of India.
140
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B. The Judgment 
 
The judgment by Justice Anand was composed of two parts: 
establishing procedural safeguards and elaborating a system of compensation 
for victims of police abuse.
141
  The judgment emphasized first the global effort 
against torture and its status as a special aim of international conventions and 
declarations.
142
  In light of the unique role of police in efforts against torture, 
Anand invoked the particular sections of the Constitution of India applicable to 
forbidding torture, abuse, and lethal force in custodial detention.
143
  Article 21 
provides that “[n]o person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty 
except according to procedure established by law.”144  Article 22 secures basic 
rights of arrestees including rights to know reasons for detention and 
immediate access to legal counsel.
145
  Despite constitutional protections, police 
seeking to secure evidence and confessions failed to record arrests and 
recharacterized detentions as “prolonged interrogation[s].”146 
 
Instances have come to ou[r] notice where the police [have] 
arrested a person without warrant in connection with the 
investigation of an offence, without recording the arrest, and the 
arrest[ed] person has been subjected to torture to extract 
information from him for the purpose of further investigation or 
for recovery of case property or for extracting confession etc.  
The torture and injury caused on the body of the arrestee has 
sometime[s] resulted [in] his death.  Death in custody is not 
generally shown in the records of the lock-up and every effort is 
made by the police to dispose of the body or to make out a case 
that the arrested person died after he was released from 
custody.
147
 
 
In the view of the Court, the difficulty in securing evidence against 
police officers in detention circumstances meant that the only effective 
safeguards would be those that facilitated procedural transparency and 
accountability.
148
  Outlined in paragraph 36, the judgment imposed basic 
measures of wearing plainly identifiable police credentials, recording arrests in 
the presence of a family witness, informing of next of kin in case of arrest, 
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reading of rights and warnings, availing detainees of physician services, 
providing lawyers, and posting notices in police stations.
149
 
The Court further expanded its powers to establish a compensatory 
scheme for violation of constitutional rights—even though the Government of 
India had expressly reserved against the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (“ICCPR”)150 terms for compensation for victims of unlawful 
arrest and the Indian Constitution conferred no such right.
151
  Justice Anand 
confirmed that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was not applicable in cases 
where public servants violated constitutional rights, described actions for civil 
damages as too burdensome, and appropriated the power to award monetary 
damages in the court, “finding the infringement of the indefeasible right to 
life” which may be “the only effective remedy to apply balm to the wounds of 
the family members of the . . . victim.”152   
 
C. Comparative Constitutional Adjudication 
 
The Court analyzed foreign law, both judicial and legislative, in both 
the procedural and compensatory parts of the judgment.   
 
1. United Kingdom  
 
Drawing upon the English experience, Anand suggested that the British 
followed a similarly “progressive” path from permitting torture during 
investigations, to strongly narrowing the power of the state when investigating 
crimes.  
 
The police powers of arrest, detention and interrogation in 
England were examined in depth by Sir Cyril Philips’ 
Committee . . . .  In regard to the power of arrest, the Report 
recommended that the power to arrest without a warrant must 
be related to and limited by the object to be served by the arrest, 
namely, to prevent the suspect from destroying evidence or 
interfering with witnesses or warning accomplices who have not 
yet been arrested or where there is good reason to suspect the 
repetition of the offence and not to every case irrespective of the 
object sought to be achieved . . . .  The power of arrest, 
interrogation and detention has now been streamlined in 
England on the basis of the suggestions made by the Royal 
Commission . . . .
153
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2. United States 
 
The judgment further considered the balancing required where the 
flexibility of the police to investigate and prevent crime and terrorism 
conflicted with the ideals of a society protective of its civil liberties.  
 
It is being said in certain quarters that with more and more 
liberalisation and enforcement of fundamental rights, it would 
lead to difficulties in the detection of crimes committed 
by . . . hardened criminals . . . .  The cure cannot, however, be 
wors[e] than the disease itself.
154
   
 
Citing Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court ruled that the police 
power of the state was always limited by constitutionally guaranteed rights
155
:  
 
A recurrent argument, made in these cases is that society’s need 
for interrogation out-weighs the privilege.  This argument is not 
unfamiliar to this Court. . . .  The who[l]e thrust of our 
foregoing discussion demonstrates that the Constitution has 
prescribed the rights of the individual when confronted with the 
power of Government when it provided in the Fifth Amendment 
that an individual cannot be compelled to be a witness against 
himself.  That right cannot be abridged.
156
 
 
3. Ireland 
 
Justice Anand’s opinion made more extensive use of foreign 
constitutional law in exploring the legitimacy of the Supreme Court’s ordering 
monetary damages for violation of constitutional rights.  The Court employed 
Irish constitutional decisions for the authority that a constitutional court 
enjoyed, the primary place of securing individual constitutional rights, citing 
The State (at the Prosecution of Quinn) v. Ryan,
157
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It was not the intention of the Constitution in guaranteeing the 
fundamental rights of the citizen that these rights should be set 
at [n]ought or circumvented.  The intention was that rights of 
substance were being assured to the individual and that the 
Courts were the custodians of those rights.  As a necessary 
corollary, it follows that no one can with impunity set these 
rights at [b]ought or circumvent them, and that the Court’s 
powers in this regard are as ample as the defence of the 
Constitution requires.
158
 
 
and that those rights deserved judicially created remedies, citing Byrne v. 
Ireland,
159
 
 
In several parts in the Constitution duties to make certain 
provisions for the benefit of the citizens are imposed on the 
State in terms which bestow rights upon the citizens and, unless 
some contrary provision appears in the Constitution, the 
Constitution must be deemed to have created a remedy for the 
enforcement of these rights.  It follows that, where the right is 
one guaranteed by the State it is against the State that the 
remedy must be sought if there has been a failure to discharge 
the constitutional obligation imposed.
160
 
 
4. Trinidad and Tobago 
 
The Court further relied upon the decision of Maharaj v. Attorney 
General of Trinidad and Tobago
161
 for the proposition that the remedy for 
constitutional violations undertaken by the government or through the 
omission of government action constituted a claim separate from normal civil 
causes of action sounding in tort, e.g., false imprisonment.   
 
An order for payment of compensation, [the Attorney General] 
submitted, did not amount to the enforcement of the rights that 
had been contravened.  In their Lordships’ view an order for 
payment of compensation when a right protected under Section 
I ‘has been’ contravened is clearly a form of ‘redress’ which a 
person is entitled to claim under Section 6(1) [of the 
Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago] and may well be the only 
practicable form of redress . . . .  The very wide powers to make 
                                                        
158
 Shri D.K. Basu, 1 S.C.R. 416, at para. 49 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) 
(internal punctuation omitted).  
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 Byrne v. Ireland, [1972] I.R. 241, 264 (Ir.) (Walsh, J.). 
160
 Shri D.K. Basu, 1 S.C.R. 416, at para. 50 (alteration in original). 
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orders, issue writs and give directions are ancillary to this. . . .  
[The claim for monetary compensation for deprivation of liberty 
otherwise than by due process of law] is a claim in public law 
for compensation for deprivation of liberty alone.
162
 
 
5. New Zealand 
 
The Supreme Court of India finally relied upon a New Zealand Court 
of Appeal case, which in turn employed constitutional decisions from the 
United Kingdom, Ireland, and prior constitutional precedent from India.  In 
Simpson v. Attorney General [Baigent’s Case],163 the Court of Appeal 
“considered the applicability of the doctrine of vicarious liability for torts like 
unlawful search, committed by the police officials which violate the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act . . . .”164  The court observed that: 
 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act[,] unless it is to be no more 
than an empty statement, is a commitment by the Crown that 
those who in the three branches of the government exercise 
[their] . . . duties will observe the rights that the Bill affirms.  It 
is[,] I consider[,] implicit in that commitment, indeed essential 
to its worth, that the courts are not only to observe the Bill in 
the discharge of their own duties but are able to grant 
appropriate and effective remedies where rights have been 
infringed. . . .  Enjoyment of the basic human rights are the 
entitlement of every citizen and their protection the obligation 
of every civilized state.  They are inherent in and essential to the 
structure of society.  They do not depend on the legal or 
constitutional form in which they are declared.  The reasoning 
that has led the Privy Council and the Courts of Ireland and 
India to the conclusions reached in the cases to which I have 
referred . . . is . . . equally valid to the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act if it is to have life and meaning.
165
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 Shri D.K. Basu, 1 S.C.R. 416, at paras. 51–52. 
163
 Simpson v Att’y Gen. [Baigent’s Case] [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA). 
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 Shri D.K. Basu, 1 S.C.R. 416, at para. 53. 
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IV. APPLYING THEORIES OF COMPARATIVE INTERPRETATION TO D.K. 
BASU 
 
 The court’s analysis of, and reliance upon, foreign decisions from 
common law jurisdictions present an opportunity to test universalist, 
expressivist, and pragmatist theories of comparative constitutional 
adjudication.  The Supreme Court of India used the decisions of American, 
Irish, and New Zealand courts to demonstrate a common role for courts in 
relation to the rights of the criminally accused and detained.
166
  The Court also 
weighed differing approaches to measures of damages for constitutional 
violations, including the ability of the state to seek contribution from officials 
liable for those damages. 
 
A. Universalism: Freedom from Custodial Abuse 
 
 While the Supreme Court of India focused on a fundamental norm of 
international human rights law and constitutional rights in India—the 
prohibition on torture
167—it used foreign law principally to emphasize the role 
of courts “as custodian and protector of the fundamental and the basic human 
rights of the citizens.”168  Justice Anand referred to Miranda v. Arizona for the 
principle that the state’s interest in the security of its citizens (through arrest 
and detention) was necessarily subordinate to constitutional enshrinement of 
rights against self-incrimination.
169
  The precedent from Irish and New Zealand 
courts—neither of which involved torture or custodial interrogation—went 
much further.
170
   
In The State (at the Prosecution of Quinn) v. Ryan, the Supreme Court 
of Ireland determined that an Irish inspector had, with the assistance of two 
British policemen, conspired to deprive an Irish citizen of his right to challenge 
the validity of a warrant for his arrest issued by an English court.
171
  The case 
brought to light a conflict between British law in effect before Irish 
independence—mutual backing of warrants—and the Irish Constitution, which 
granted a defendant the opportunity to contest the validity of the warrant.
172
  
Justice Anand cited Ryan for the principle that the Supreme Court as the 
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 Id. at paras. 33, 49–50, 53–54. 
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 Id. at para. 11 (“No violation of any of the human rights has been the subject of so 
many Conventions and Declarations as ‘torture’—all aiming at total banning of it in all forms 
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 Id. at para. 9. 
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 The State (at the Prosecution of Quinn) v. Ryan, [1965] I.R. 70 (Ir.). 
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“custodians of [fundamental] rights” enjoyed “powers in this regard . . . as 
ample as the defence of the Constitution requires.”173 
In Baigent’s Case, the New Zealand police visited an incorrect address 
specified on an otherwise valid warrant for the premises belonging to a 
suspected drug dealer.
174
  The occupants informed the police that they had the 
wrong address to which the police replied, “We often get it wrong, but while 
we are here, we will have a look around anyway.”175  The residents of the 
incorrectly designated address brought suit against the Attorney General for 
negligence, trespass, abuse of process, and violation of their rights under New 
Zealand’s newly adopted 1990 Bill of Rights Act, which prohibited 
unreasonable searches and seizures.
176
  The common law torts were rejected by 
the New Zealand High Court because of statutory immunities granted to police 
when executing warrants.
177
  The New Zealand Court of Appeal—the name of 
its highest court at that time—reinstated the trespass and abuse of process 
claims because statutory immunities did not protect actions taken in bad 
faith.
178
  More importantly, the Court of Appeal determined that, while the Bill 
of Rights Act did not authorize money damages for violations—indeed, the 
Court noted that Parliament had specifically rejected a draft of the Bill of 
Rights Act that included a remedies provision—the Court could fashion a 
remedy and hold the government liable for violations of rights specified in the 
law.  It is this latter authority—that courts are “not only to observe the Bill in 
the discharge of their own duties but are able to grant appropriate and effective 
remedies where rights have been infringed”—that the Supreme Court of India 
emphasized with respect to a universal role for constitutional courts.
179
  The 
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 Shri D.K. Basu, 1 S.C.R. 416, at para. 49.  In 2001, after both D.K. Basu and Baigent’s 
Case, the Irish Supreme Court cut back on the broad reading given to Quinn.  In Sinnott v. 
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[i]t is essential to read the passage [cited in D.K. Basu] in its context.  So 
read, it is clear that it is not an assertion of an unrestricted general power in 
the judicial arm of government but rather a strong and entirely appropriate 
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Sinnott v. Minister of Educ., [2001] 2 I.R. 545, 709 (Ir.). 
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 Simpson v Att’y Gen. [Baigent’s Case] [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA). 
175
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 Smillie, supra note 175, at 189 n.3 (noting the immunity extended by section 39 of the 
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 Shri D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1996) 1 S.C.R. 416, at para. 53 (India). 
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New Zealand Court of Appeal, like the Supreme Court of India, relied on the 
British Privy Council’s decision in Maharaj v. Attorney General of Trinidad 
and Tobago for the principle that the government could be held directly liable 
for breaches of public law.
180
 
Universalism conventionally emphasizes a substantive principle of 
“transcendent” law “evinced by [its] presence in legal systems in other 
countries.”181  In D.K. Basu, the relevant principle was a structural one 
emphasizing the role of constitutional courts in ensuring the fundamental rights 
of citizens.  Indeed, in the view of the Supreme Court of India, referring to the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal, that relationship “[did] not depend on the legal 
or constitutional form in which [rights] are declared.”182  Emphasizing this role 
was important because the Supreme Court of India not only substantially 
lengthened the list of procedural requirements imposed on police upon 
arresting a citizen but also ordered the availability of monetary compensation 
when citizens’ rights were violated as a result.183  Before the Supreme Court’s 
decision, the police were required not only to notify individuals arrested and 
taken into custody of the charges against them but also to produce them before 
a magistrate within twenty-four hours.
184
  The Supreme Court additionally 
required that: 
(1) The police personnel carrying out the arrest and handling the 
interrogation of the arrestee should bear accurate, visible and 
clear identification and name tags with their designations.  The 
particulars of all such police personnel who handle interrogation 
of the arrestee insist be recorded in a register. 
(2) That the police officer carrying out the arrest of the arrestee 
shall prepare a memo of arrest at the time of arrest and such 
memo shall be attested by at least one witness, who may be 
either a member of the family of the arrestee or a respectable 
person of the locality from where the arrest is made.  It shall 
also be counter signed by the arrestee and shall contain the time 
and date of arrest. 
(3) A person who has been arrested or detained and is being 
held in custody in a police or interrogation centre or other lock-
up, shall be entitled to have one friend or relative or other 
person known to him or having interest in his welfare being 
informed, as soon as practicable, that he has been arrested and is 
being detained at the particular place, unless the attesting 
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witness of the memo of arrest is himself such a friend or a 
relative of the arrestee. 
(4) The time, place of arrest and venue of custody of an arrestee 
must be notified by the police where the next friend or relative 
of the arrestee lives outside the district or town through the 
Legal Aid Organisation in the District and the police station of 
the area concerned telegraphically within a period of 8 to 12 
hours after the arrest. 
(5) The person arrested must be made aware of this right to 
have someone informed of his arrest or detention as soon as he 
is put under arrest or is detained. 
(6) An entry must be made in the diary at the place of detention 
regarding the arrest of the person which shall also disclose the 
name of the next friend of the person who has been informed of 
the arrest and the names and particulars of the police officials in 
whose custody the arrestee is. 
(7) The arrestee should, where he so requests, be also examined 
at the time of his arrest and major and minor injuries, if any 
present on his/her bed, must be recorded at that time.  The 
“Inspection Memo” must be signed both by the arrestee and the 
police officer effecting the arrest and its copy provided to the 
arrestee. 
(8) The arrestee should be subjected to medical examination by 
a trained doctor every 48 hours during his detention in custody 
by a doctor on the panel of approved doctors appointed by 
Director, Health Services of the concerned State or Union 
Territory.  Director, Health Services should prepare such a 
penal for all Tehsils and Districts as well. 
(9) Copies of all the documents including the memo of arrest, 
referred to above, should be sent to the . . . Magistrate for his 
record. 
(10) The arrestee may be permitted to meet his lawyer during 
interrogation, though not throughout the interrogation. 
(11) A police control room should be provided at all district and 
State Headquarters, where information regarding the arrest and 
the place of custody of the arrestee shall be communicated by 
the officer causing the arrest, within 12 hours of effecting the 
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arrest and at the police control room it should be displayed on 
conspicuous notice board.
185
 
 
Justice Anand articulated, and relied upon, the proposition that a state is 
responsible for the enforcement of its laws through the police but that the 
violent methods and authority attaching to that responsibility give rise to two 
“threats.”  First, the police may accurately identify criminal suspects, but in the 
process of collecting evidence or interrogating the suspect, the police will use 
violent methods to coerce confessions.
186
  Second, the authority and violence 
of the police, if not properly administered, may become an arm of local bosses 
who use the state’s machinery to settle scores, intimidate ethnic or economic 
rivals, and jeopardize faith in the rule of law.
187
  Yet the Supreme Court of 
India did not use foreign precedent principally to support those assertions—
although Miranda v. Arizona certainly does.  It instead used foreign precedent 
to suggest that it is the courts’ role to strike that balance.   
 
B. Expressivism: Convergence and Divergence in Constitutional 
Structure and Judicially-Ordered Remedies 
 
 Expressivist interpretation is fundamentally about courts exploring 
foreign precedent in order to discover and explain constitutional difference.  
Expressivism requires at least three procedural steps:  identifying underlying 
assumptions of foreign jurisprudence, analyzing differences between those 
assumptions and “domestic assumptions,” and sharpening constitutional 
provisions as a matter of historical and social circumstances shaping the 
deciding court’s constitution.188   
 Citing relevant Irish precedent, the Court noted that “Ireland, which has 
a written constitution, guaranteeing fundamental rights . . . like the Indian 
Constitution contains no provision of remedy for the infringement of those 
rights.”189  Yet the Supreme Court of Ireland had fashioned remedies for 
constitutional violations that imposed liability not only on wayward actors—
such as police acting on a knowingly invalid warrant—but on the state itself 
for “failure to discharge the constitutional obligation imposed.”190  In Byrne v. 
Ireland, the Supreme Court of Ireland determined that the government’s 
sovereign immunity had not survived the drafting of the 1937 Constitution, 
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which specified certain immunities belonging to the President and members of 
the Oireachtas, Ireland’s parliament.191   
Katherine Byrne’s suit was fairly pedestrian, so far as it goes.  She fell 
on a public walkway after employees from Ireland’s Department of Posts and 
Telegraphs failed to effectively fill a trench, causing a subsidence of the path 
on which Ms. Byrne stumbled.
192
  But her ability to sue the state for damages 
in tort implicated Ireland’s sovereign immunity and thus the courts’ ability to 
fashion remedies for violations of constitutional rights.  If sovereign immunity 
barred her action, it barred actions against the state for other violations as well. 
This distinction had emerged in Indian jurisprudence, although it was 
treated differently.  While Justice Anand conceded that the sovereign immunity 
defense might obtain for actions in tort, it did not provide a defense against 
violations of fundamental rights: 
 
In this context it is sufficient to say that the decision of this 
Court in Kasturilal upholding the State’s plea of sovereign 
immunity for tortious acts of its servants is confined to the 
sphere of liability in tort, which is distinct from the State’s 
liability for contravention of fundamental rights to which the 
application in the constitutional scheme and is no defence to the 
constitutional remedy under Articles 32 and 226 of the 
Constitution which enables award of fundamental rights, when 
the only practicable mode of enforcement of the fundamental 
rights call be the award of compensation.
193
  
 
Without this distinction, he wrote, the law “relegat[ed] the aggrieved to 
the remedies available in civil law, limit[ing] the role of the courts too much, 
as the protector and custodian of the indefeasible rights of the citizens.”194   
 
The courts have the obligation to satisfy the social aspirations of 
the citizens because the courts and the law are for the people 
and expected to respond to their aspirations.  A Court of law 
cannot close its consciousness and aliveness to stark realities.  
                                                        
191
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Mere punishment of the offender cannot give much solace to 
the family of the victim—civil action for damages is a long 
drawn and cumbersome judicial process.
 195
  
 
To support this conclusion, Justice Anand relied on the Judicial 
Committee of the U.K. Privy Council interpreting Section 6 of the Trinidad 
Constitution.
196
  That section provided that “without prejudice to any other 
action with respect to the same matter which is available . . . apply to the High 
Court for redress.”197  A majority of the Judicial Committee determined that 
the provision authorized the availability of a remedy for breaches of 
fundamental rights that sounded not in tort (vicarious liability for the acts of 
government agents) but in a direct action against the state for a violation of 
public law.
198
  
 The justifications that the Supreme Court of India identified for its 
broad remedial powers fit within the “expressivist”, “dialogical”, 
“engagement”, and “bricolage” modes of constitutional interpretation.  While 
Justice Anand did not emphasize the common legal heritage shared by the 
courts from which he borrowed, elsewhere in the opinion he hinted at the 
relevance of systems derived from British judicial institutions.  His reference 
to foreign law began with early English tolerance of torture and forced 
confessions and British progress toward enlightened practices (based, in part, 
on Canadian experience).
199
  He referred only to legal authorities that shared 
British judicial heritage.
200
  
While India’s Constitution reflected a separate national experience—he 
noted the Court’s willingness to uphold preventive detention measures based 
on India’s security situation—he identified constitutional similarities and 
differences that nevertheless imparted broad remedial powers to courts to 
protect fundamental rights.
201
  Ireland and India, unlike New Zealand or the 
United Kingdom, decided cases according to a written constitutional 
tradition.
202
  Although they diverged on the issue of the applicability of 
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sovereign immunity to tort suits, they shared a tradition of court-fashioned 
remedies for violations of constitutional rights.
203
 
 
C. Pragmatism: Defining the Limits of Money Damages as 
Remedy for Civil Rights Violations 
 
 Faced with a number of victims of police abuse across India and only 
prospectively imposed procedures for ensuring their rights, the Supreme Court 
of India also grappled with what remedy, if any, it could grant retrospectively.  
The Court determined that mere judicial acknowledgment of the wrongs “does 
not by itself provide any meaningful remedy” to victims of custodial 
violence
204—nor, in the Court’s view, did statutory provisions of the India 
Penal Code, which regulated police who violated detainees’ rights.205  Justice 
Anand acknowledged that India had reserved against Article 9(5) of the 
ICCPR—which requires that victims of unlawful arrest or detention “have an 
enforceable right to compensation”206—and the Constitution of India provided 
no express authority to grant compensation.
207
 
While the Court located its authority to fashion remedies in its basic 
structural role of protecting fundamental rights, the amount of damages was 
less clear.  The courts of India, like courts elsewhere, had first struggled with 
whether courts enjoyed any right to award money damages, a power that 
implicated legislative prerogatives.
208
  Even if a court concluded, as many had, 
that an order to pay money damages was within the power of the court to 
remedy violations of constitutional rights, they next grappled with the 
appropriate measure, often noting the difficulty in analogizing to tort 
equivalents.
209
  This may in part explain Justice Anand’s reference to Maharaj 
v. Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago.
210
   
In Maharaj, a trial court judge cited a barrister of the Trinidad and 
Tobago bar for contempt of court based on a vague and otherwise unexplained 
“vicious attack on the integrity of the Court.”211  Maharaj ordered the attorney 
to serve seven days’ imprisonment.212  Under the law of Trinidad and Tobago 
at the time, the attorney had no right to appeal a contempt order to the Trinidad 
and Tobago Court of Appeal and could only appeal to the Judicial Committee 
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of the United Kingdom Privy Council (the highest court of appeal for Trinidad 
and Tobago) with special leave.
213
 
While the attorney did pursue that route, the attorney also brought an 
original suit against Maharaj and the Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago 
for violation of his constitutional right “not to be deprived of his liberty 
without due process of law.”214  Section 6 of the Constitution, at the time, 
provided:  
 
[W]ithout prejudice to any other action with respect to the same 
matter which is lawfully available, that person may apply to the 
High Court for redress. . . .  The High Court shall have original 
jurisdiction . . . and may make such orders, issue such writs and 
give such directions as it may consider appropriate for the 
purpose of enforcing, or securing the enforcement of 
[constitutional rights]  . . . .
215
 
 
The plaintiff requested a declaration that the order committing him to 
prison for contempt was unconstitutional and illegal, that he be immediately 
released from custody, and that damages be awarded him against the Attorney 
General “for wrongful detention and false imprisonment.”216  The second trial 
judge who heard the motion refused jurisdiction, arguing that to hear the 
complaint would in effect be an exercise of appellate review over the initial 
contempt order.
217
  When the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council finally 
heard his appeal from the initial contempt order, it determined that the court 
had violated his right to contest the charges against him.
218
  On appeal from the 
second action, the Judicial Committee determined that the state owed him 
monetary compensation for the loss of his liberty because he had already 
served his seven days.
219
  “The contravention was in the past; the only 
practicable form of redress was monetary compensation.”220  In order to reach 
that conclusion, the Committee liberally interpreted “redress” within the 
meaning of Section 6.
221
 
The Judicial Committee distinguished a tort action for false 
imprisonment principally on the basis of damages: 
 
The claim is not a claim in private law for damages for the tort 
of false imprisonment, under which the damages recoverable 
are at large and would include damages for loss of reputation.  It 
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is a claim in public law for compensation for deprivation of 
liberty alone.  Such compensation would include any loss of 
earnings consequent on the imprisonment and recompense for 
the inconvenience and distress suffered by the appellant during 
his incarceration.
222
 
 
The Committee noted that these damages were available from the state directly 
and not the trial judge personally, a finding that was important to preserve the 
“long established rule of public policy that a judge cannot be made personally 
liable in court proceedings for anything done by him in the exercise or 
purported exercise of his judicial functions.”223 
 
[N]o change is involved in the rule that a judge cannot be made 
personally liable for what he has done when acting or 
purporting to act in a judicial capacity.  The claim for redress 
under section 6 (1) for what has been done by a judge is a claim 
against the state for what has been done in the exercise of the 
judicial power of the state.  This is not vicarious liability; it is a 
liability of the state itself.  It is not a liability in tort at all; it is a 
liability in the public law of the state, not of the judge himself, 
which has been newly created by section 6 (1) and (2) of the 
Constitution.
224
 
 
In Maharaj, the Judicial Committee noted that the plaintiff did not request, and 
therefore it did not pass upon, whether punitive damages were available for 
violations of constitutional rights.
225
 
Justice Anand adapted this regime from the Maharaj case.  The Privy 
Council determined in Maharaj that a plaintiff in a constitutional rights case 
enjoyed a right to compensation from the state for a violation of public law but 
barred any resort that the plaintiff or the state might have to the individual 
perpetrator of the constitutional violation.
226
  Thus, a trial judge might violate a 
party’s (or attorney’s) rights but would not be individually liable for 
compensation paid to compensate the victim.  By contrast, the Supreme Court 
of India determined that courts could award victims compensatory, but not 
punitive, damages (the Maharaj court reserved ruling on the possibility of 
punitive damages in constitutional cases), but the state would enjoy a right of 
indemnification against the “wrong-doer.”227  Moreover, damages awarded for 
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 Id. at 400. 
223
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224
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225
 Id. at 400. 
226
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227
 Shri D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1996) 1 S.C.R. 416, at para. 56 (India) 
(alteration in original) (“The claim of the citizen is based on the principle of strict liability to 
which the defence of sovereign immunity is not available and the citizen must receive the 
amount of compensation from the State, which shall have the right to be indemnified by the 
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violation of a constitutional right were in addition to, not in place of, any tort 
remedies available to a plaintiff, although the State could, under certain 
circumstances, offset any award of damages for a constitutional violation with 
an award obtained in a tort suit.
228
  
V. D.K. BASU V. STATE OF WEST BENGAL AS POLITICAL DOCTRINE 
  
  The Supreme Court of India’s judgment in Shri D.K. Basu therefore 
confirms the basic soundness of current categorization and classification 
schemes for constitutional borrowing as articulated by Choudhry, Jackson, 
Tushnet, and others.
229
  But what about the more fundamental concern that 
judges, in the course of borrowing constitutional precedent, are not just wisely 
consulting a useful body of persuasive authority but are, in fact, using foreign 
precedent to enhance or establish the law-making powers of the judiciary?   
In D.K. Basu, there are two principal actions which might support 
critics’ concerns.  First, each principle of foreign constitutional law cited by 
Justice Anand is used to expand the remedial and structural powers of the 
Supreme Court of India.  Anand cited Miranda v. Arizona for the non-
derogability of the rights of criminal detainees,
230
 Irish constitutional precedent 
reserving to the Supreme Court “powers [to remedy violations of rights] . . . as 
ample as the defence of the Constitution requires,”231 Trinidadian precedent to 
establish that plaintiffs could resort immediately to the Supreme Court for 
relief instead of pursuing tort actions against state officers,
232
 and New Zealand 
precedent for the extraordinary conclusion that the rights of criminal detainees 
                                                                                                                                                  
wrong doer.  In the assessment of compensation, the emphasis has to be on the compensatory 
and not on [the] punitive element.  The objective is to apply balm to the wounds and not to 
punish the transgressor or the offender, as awarding appropriate punishment for the offence 
(irrespective of compensation) must be fell to the criminal courts in which the offender is 
prosecuted, which the State, in law, is duty bound to do.  The award of compensation in the 
public law jurisdiction is also without prejudice to any other action like civil suit for damage 
which is lawfully available to the victim or the heirs of the deceased victim with respect to the 
same matter for the tortious act committed by the functionaries of the State.  The quantum of 
compensation will, of course, depend upon the peculiar facts of each case and no strait, jacket 
[sic] formula can be evolved in that behalf.  The relief to redress the wrong for 
the established invasion of the fundamental rights of the citizen, under the public law 
jurisdiction is, thus, in addition to the traditional remedies and not in derogation of them.  The 
amount of compensation as awarded by the Court and paid by the State to redress the wrong 
done, may in a given case, be adjusted against any amount which may be awarded to the 
claimant by way of damages in a civil suit.”).  
228
 Id. 
229
 GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, THE WHEEL OF LAW: INDIA’S SECULARISM IN 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 133 (2003) (“The widely renowned American 
solicitude for local authority was carefully noted as a predicate for observing that even the 
framers of the United States Constitution had provided for a safeguard against a ‘failure of 
constitutional machinery’ in the states.  Justice Sawant pointed out that Article 356 [of the 
Indian Constitution] ‘was based on Article 4, Section 4 of the American document’ . . . .”). 
230
 Shri D.K. Basu, 1 S.C.R. 416, at para 33. 
231
 Id. at para. 49. 
232
 Id. at para. 51. 
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are human rights that “do not depend on the legal or constitutional form in 
which they are declared.”233  Thus, the Supreme Court of India appropriated to 
itself the ability to identify, regulate, and redress wrongdoing by state police 
officials and their agents.  Similarly, it appeared able to do so as a function of 
universal human rights and not, it would seem, by other constitutional or legal 
constraints. 
 
A. The Accumulation of Structural-Expansionist Precedent 
From Maharaj to Baigent’s Case 
 
 Second, D.K. Basu represented the accumulation and mutually-
reinforced legitimacy of structural-expansionist precedent drawn from widely 
disparate constitutional and factual contexts.  The principle that courts must 
define and enforce procedural and monetary remedies for violations of 
constitutional rights migrated from the Trinidadian case of Maharaj in the civil 
contempt context to Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, a 1993 Supreme Court 
of India decision on custodial death,
234
 to one of several additional precedents 
used (including Nilabati Behera) by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in 
Baigent’s Case (in the search and seizure context), all of which the Supreme 
Court of India used again in D.K. Basu.  
In Nilabati Behera, the Supreme Court of India ordered the payment of 
monetary compensation for the custodial death
235
 of Nilabati Behera’s son, 
Suman Behera.
236
  Suman was a twenty-two-year-old male arrested on 
suspicion of theft and detained by the police at 8 a.m. on December 1, 1987.
237
  
Thirty hours later, Suman’s mother learned that her son’s dead body had been 
found by nearby train tracks.
238
   
Suman’s mother brought an action based on the theory that custodial 
death amounted to a violation of Suman’s Article 21 constitutional right to 
life.
239
  After considering relatively objective medical evidence to reject police 
assertions that Suman escaped and was struck by a passing train,
 240
 the Court 
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 Id. at para. 53. 
234
 Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, (1993) 2 S.C.C. 746 (India), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3f4b8e004.pdf. 
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 “Custodial death” means “the death of a person in custody whether of the [p]olice or 
[j]udicial.”  Sonakshi Verma,  Custodial Death, ARTICLESBASE (Mar. 12, 2010), 
http://www.articlesbase.com/criminal-articles/custodial-death-1977427.html. 
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 Nilabati Behera, 2 S.C.C. 746, at para. 24. 
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 Id. at para. 1. 
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 Id.  For a complete list of Suman’s injuries, see id. at para. 7. 
239
 Id. at para. 1.  Suman’s mother actually wrote a letter to the Court outlining her 
grievance, and the Court treated the letter as though it were a Writ Petition under Article 32 of 
the Constitution of India.  Fali S. Nariman, Fifty Years of Human Rights Protection in India: 
The Record of 50 Years of Constitutional Practice, 12 STUDENT ADVOC. 4, 10 (2000).  
240
 Nilabati Behera, 2 S.C.C. 746, at para. 8.  Evidence was produced before the district 
judge from a medical examiner that indicated that Suman’s injuries were caused by blunt 
objects and that he received them ante-mortem.  Id.  Thus, this evidence “exclude[d] the 
possibility of all the injuries to Suman Behera being caused in a train accident while indicating 
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analyzed whether or not it had the authority to provide compensation for the 
deprivation of a fundamental right.  In order for the Court to reach its decision, 
it relied on domestic,
241
 foreign, and international human rights authority.
242
   
The Court in Nilabati Behera used Maharaj v. Attorney General of 
Trinidad and Tobago for the same proposition as D.K. Basu (Justice Anand sat 
on both panels):  that violation of constitutional rights imparted a right for the 
plaintiff to bring suit directly against the state for a breach of public law, not, 
or at least not exclusively, on a theory based in tort or vicarious liability.
243
  
The Court noted that in Maharaj, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
considered whether Section 6 of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago, 
excerpted above, permitted monetary compensation.
244
  The state’s argument, 
“that an order for payment of compensation did not amount to the enforcement 
of the rights that had been contravened, was expressly rejected.”245  Instead, 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held “that an order for payment of 
compensation, when a right protected had been contravened, is clearly a form 
of ‘redress’ which a person is entitled to claim under Section 6, and may well 
be ‘the only practicable form of redress’.”246  Justice Verma, who wrote the 
opinion in Nilabati Behera, cited Maharaj for the proposition that 
“enforcement of [a] constitutional right and grant of redress embraces award of 
compensation as part of the legal consequences of its contravention.”247   
                                                                                                                                                  
that all of them could result from the merciless beating given to him.”  Id.  In light of this 
evidence, the police’s defense was viewed by the Court rather weakly based on several factors.  
The police did not produce any evidence that Suman had escaped or that they had conducted a 
search.  Id. at para. 6.  The Court also noted that the body was discovered by rail workers the 
following morning, yet the police did not arrive nor take custody of the body until much later 
in the day.  Id.  The Court seemingly inferred that if the police were worried about a custodial 
escapee, they certainly did not act as though re-apprehending him was any sort of priority.  See 
id.  Based on the facts, “[t]he burden [was] . . . clearly on the [police] to explain how Suman 
Behera sustained those injuries which caused his death.”  Id. at para. 4.  The police agreed that 
they would have been liable for depriving  a person of his or her fundamental rights in their 
custody; however, they simply denied depriving Suman of his fundamental rights.  Id. at para. 
5. 
241
 Chief among these sources was Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar.  In Rudul Sah, the 
Supreme Court of India determined that it had the authority to allow compensation for the 
deprivation of a fundamental right under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, stating that 
“respect for the rights of individuals is the true bastion of democracy.  Therefore, the State 
must repair the damage done by its officers to [a] petitioner’s rights.  It may have recourse 
against those officers.”  Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, (1983) 3 S.C.R. 508, 514 (India). 
242
 Besides the Maharaj case, which will be discussed in length above, the Nilabati Behera 
Court references Article 9(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966.  
Nilabati Behera, 2 S.C.C. 746, at para. 21 (“Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful 
arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation.”).  See also ICCPR, supra 
note 150. 
243
 Nilabati Behera, 2 S.C.C. 746, at paras. 15–17 (citing Maharaj v. Att’y Gen. of Trin. & 
Tobago, [1979] A.C. 385). 
244
 Id. at para. 15. 
245
 Id. 
246
 Id. 
247
 Id. at para. 16.   
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 Simpson v. Attorney General [Baigent’s Case] relied upon both 
Maharaj and Nilabati Behera to extend the New Zealand Court of Appeal’s 
ability to order relief for violations of rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights 
Act.
248
  The New Zealand Court of Appeal broadened the Crown’s liability for 
the violation of civil rights (the aforementioned illegal search of Mrs. 
Baigent’s home under the strenuous objection of the family who alerted the 
police to the inaccuracy of the warrant).
249
  The Court outlined three ways the 
Crown could be liable for a breach of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act:  1) 
“[i]t is an independent action against the Crown; 2) [i]t is an action in public 
law, not tort law in any form; 3) [i]t is a strict liability action for contravention 
of fundamental human rights.”250  The Baigent’s Court, quoting Lord Diplock 
in Maharaj, stated: 
 
Read in the light of the recognition that each of the highly 
diversified rights and freedoms of the individual described in 
section 1 already existed, it is in their Lordships’ view clear that 
the protection afforded was against contravention of those rights 
or freedoms by the state or by some other public authority 
endowed by law with coercive powers.  The chapter is 
concerned with public law, not private law. . . .  The claim for 
redress under section 6(1) for what has been done by a judge is 
a claim against the state for what has been done in the exercise 
of the judicial power of the state.  This is not vicarious liability; 
it is a liability of the state itself.  It is not a liability in tort at all; 
it is a liability in the public law of the state, not of the judge 
himself, which has been newly created by section 6(1) and (2) 
of the Constitution [of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago].
251
 
 
Lacking any explicit grant to remedy violations of its Bill of Rights 
Act, like Section 6 of the Trinidad & Tobago Constitution, the Court of Appeal 
cited Byrne v. Ireland,
 252
  State v. Ryan,
253
 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics
254
 for the general proposition that 
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 Simpson v Att’y Gen. [Baigent’s Case] [1994] 3 NZLR 667, 692, 700 (CA).  
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 See id. 
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 Melanie Smith, Note, Burgeoning Baigent?: A Critique of the Law Commission’s 
Analysis of Baigent’s Case, 28 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 283, 285–86 (1998) 
(footnotes omitted). 
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 Baigent’s Case, 3 NZLR at 692 (quoting Maharaj v. Att’y Gen. of Trin. & Tobago, 
[1979] A.C. 385, 396, 399) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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 Baigent’s Case actually referenced several cases from the Irish Supreme Court, but 
Ryan and Byrne were the major influencing cases.  See id. at  701–02. 
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 The State (at the Prosecution of Quinn) v. Ryan, [1965] I.R. 70 (Ir.). 
254
 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971).  Bivens, unlike the other cases referenced thus far, actually allows for suit to be 
brought in private law.  See id. at 397; see also Baigent’s Case, 3 NZLR at 702. 
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courts must safeguard constitutional rights.
 255
  As J.A. Smillie noted, the 
problem with the application of those precedents is that the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act “is not an entrenched supreme law like the Constitutions of 
Ireland and the United States”; it was passed as an ordinary statute.256  Indeed, 
parliamentarians had considered and rejected judicially enforceable rights 
under the Act.
257
  However, citing Nilabati Behera, the Court of Appeal 
determined that limiting the plaintiffs to actions in tort improperly constrained 
the fundamental role of courts in guaranteeing fundamental rights:  
  
The old doctrine of only relegating the aggrieved to the 
remedies available in civil law limits the role of the courts too 
much as protector and guarantor of the indefeasible rights of the 
citizens.  The courts have the obligation to satisfy the social 
aspirations of the citizens because the courts and the law are for 
the people and expected to respond to their aspirations. . . .  The 
purpose of public law is not only to civilize public power but 
also to assure the citizen that they live under a legal system 
which aims to protect their interests and preserve their rights.
258
 
 
Based on American, Indian, and Irish precedent (albeit in starkly different 
constitutional and factual contexts), the Baigent’s Court determined “that the 
courts are the ultimate guardians of human rights and they must enforce those 
rights regardless of Parliament’s intention.”259 
The Baigent’s dissent made the point that the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act could be repealed at any time by a simple majority vote and 
therefore lacked the equivalent democratic weight as fundamental constitutions 
that provided specific and detailed mechanisms for amendment or change.
260
  
Nevertheless, the Baigent’s Court concluded that “[t]he New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act, unless it is to be no more than an empty statement, is a 
commitment by the Crown that those who in the three branches of the 
government exercise its functions, powers and duties will observe the rights 
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 Baigent’s Case, 3 NZLR at 701 (quoting Byrne v. Ireland, [1972] I.R. 241, 264 (Ir.) 
(Walsh, J.)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“In several parts in the Constitution duties to 
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 Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, (1993) 2 S.C.C. 746, at paras. 33–34 (India). 
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 Smillie, supra note 175, at 197.  
260
 See id. at 190–91.   
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that the Bill affirms.”261  The Bill of Rights Act surely implemented 
obligations that New Zealand had undertaken in ratifying the ICCPR, so it 
arguably represented the kind of fundamental rights for which the Irish and 
U.S. Constitutions stood.  However, the ICCPR itself gives states substantial 
flexibility in implementing its provisions and by no means requires or 
authorizes judiciaries to have the final say on enforcement.
262
 
 
B. From Baigent’s Case to D.K. Basu 
 
The panel in D.K. Basu imported the accumulated precedent beginning 
with Nilabati Behera in both establishing Miranda-like protections for 
arrestees as well as a comprehensive regime for monetary compensation 
should those protections be violated.  It is entirely possible that the D.K. Basu 
panel could have constructed the same regime based on its own precedent.  
Indeed, as early as 1983, the Supreme Court of India signaled its potential 
power to order compensation for breaches of Article 21 in Rudul Sah v. State 
of Bihar, noting that “[o]ne of the telling ways in which . . . the mandate of 
Article 21 [is] secured, is to mulct its violaters in the payment of monetary 
compensation.”263  It had rejected state sovereign immunity in the context of 
police assault in Saheli, A Women’s Resources Centre v. Commissioner of 
Police, Delhi,
264
 although Nilabati Behera and D.K. Basu are regarded as the 
most important decisions establishing the Court’s constitutional basis for 
awarding compensation for violations of Article 21.
265
  The Supreme Court of 
India’s citation of foreign precedent may have served a signaling function that, 
like other states in which the rule of law was well established, India would not 
tolerate abuses in police custody.
266
 
Another less flattering possibility is that Justice Anand duplicated, 
without any significant analysis as to germaneness, the foreign precedent cited 
in Baigent’s Case.  Former Supreme Court of India Justice Ruma Pal used the 
Fifth V.M. Tarkunde Memorial Lecture to expose what she called the “seven 
sins” of the Indian judiciary including “plagiarism and prolixity”: 
 
If ‘independence’ is taken to mean ‘capable of thinking for 
oneself’ then the fourth sin is plagiarism and prolixity.  I club 
the two together because the root cause is often the same 
namely the prolific and often unnecessary use of passages from 
text-books and decisions of other judges—without 
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acknowledgment in the first case and with acknowledgment 
in the latter.  Many judgments are in fact mere compendia or 
digests of decisions on a particular issue with very little original 
reasoning in support of the conclusion.
267
 
 
Yet Justice Anand’s use of foreign precedent was combined with prior 
domestic precedent as part of a broader effort to show consensus among states 
with legal systems in the British tradition and the similar practice among courts 
in those jurisdictions of reserving for themselves the last say on the substance 
of fundamental rights and the authority of courts, generally, to safeguard 
them
268
:   
 
[I]t is now a well accepted proposition in most of the 
jurisdictions, that monetary . . . compensation is an appropriate 
and indeed an effective and sometime[s] perhaps the only 
suitable remedy for redressal of the established infringement of 
the fundamental right to life of a citizen by the public servants 
and the State is victoriously liable for their acts.
269
 
 
In some sense, this is exactly the way jurisprudence should, or at least 
does, develop in what Anne-Marie Slaughter has referred to as “a global 
community of courts.”270  In this context, constitutional courts may view 
themselves as part of a consensus-building, rights-protecting regime that shares 
features of the universalist and expressivist theories.  Courts that engage in this 
regime may adopt the same prima facie legitimacy of each other’s judgments.  
In D.K. Basu, Justice Anand gives some evidence of this community, in that 
the New Zealand Simpson court adopted foreign precedents, including an 
earlier judgment of the Supreme Court of India on rights of detainees,
271
 
which, in turn, serves as part of the justification for the result reached in D.K. 
Basu.  The court’s judgment thus derives from a legal regime composed of 
constitutional courts.
272
   
On one hand, there may be nothing particularly to worry critics of 
comparative constitutional adjudication, given that D.K. Basu as well as the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal interpreted their laws in light of national 
obligations under the ICCPR.  Even U.S. federal courts acknowledge that 
looking at foreign precedent is part of ensuring the federal government’s 
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interest in uniform treaty interpretation.
273
  Moreover, courts read new civil 
causes of action and remedies into existing constitutional and statutory regimes 
with some frequency.   
On the other hand, the process by which courts in India and New 
Zealand used each other’s constitutional adjudication to expand their powers to 
remedy police abuse and waive sovereign immunity for official misconduct 
gives at least some evidence that constitutional borrowing may lead to an 
additional source of law-making authority lacking the conventional attributes 
of democratic law-making.  It is true, as David Fontana has suggested, that 
there is no shortage of comparative constitutional doctrine that might be used 
to support principles of judicial restraint, rather than activism or even activism 
consistent with “conservative” politics.274  Indeed, when the Supreme Court of 
New Zealand (established in 2004 to be the new highest court of appeal) was 
presented the opportunity to extend the rule in Baigent’s Case to judicial 
violations of fundamental rights, it declined to do so.  Justices McGrath and 
Young, writing in the majority, emphasized the constitutional difference 
between Trinidad and Tobago’s constitution relevant in Maharaj and cited the 
U.S. Supreme Court case of Bradley v. Fisher
275
 for the impracticability of a 
system allowing bad faith, gross negligence, or recklessness exceptions to a 
broad doctrine of judicial immunity.
276
  Yet whatever the politics underlying 
any given constitutional dispute, D.K. Basu and the precedent upon which it 
was based appear to show another dimension to an already complex 
countermajoritarian difficulty posed by judges with independent authority to 
make or shape laws. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
The Supreme Court of India’s judgment in D.K. Basu thus, by and 
large, confirms current scholarly classification schemes for comparative 
constitutional adjudication.  The procedural and compensatory regime imposed 
by the Court tracked a universalist interpretation of rights of criminally 
accused and the role of courts in preventing the abuse of executive power in 
the local enforcement of laws.  The Supreme Court of India further engaged in 
expressive interpretation in clarifying its own constitutional machinery and the 
available remedial powers for the court as a part of that machinery.  
Pragmatically, the Court could have adopted any of a number measures of 
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damages and indemnificatory possibilities with respect to individual states, 
police officers, or other government agents.   
 Yet the judgment provides some grounds for critics’ concerns.  While 
the confrontation between civil liberties and the necessity of effective law 
enforcement faces the vast majority of modern states, the role of the courts is 
not necessarily a fixed one.  D.K. Basu established or solidified the Supreme 
Court of India’s role as a preeminent player in resolving that confrontation, a 
role that may be problematic given India’s vast size and recurrent 
insurrectionary activity.  Indeed, the role of courts on that particular issue 
necessarily involves historical context.  Constitutional courts like South 
Africa’s may engage in comparative jurisprudence in order to 
“internationalize” their legal regimes to “affirm [their] membership in, or to 
rejoin, the mainstream of international society.”277  Some South African 
Constitutional Court judges have explicitly invoked this aim, as, for example, 
did Justice Aharon Barak of Israel.
278
  
Judges increasingly interacting with one another, facing common 
challenges of interpretation and the ordering of rights, will almost inevitably 
form important transnational linkages in which constitutional law becomes 
“international” and for which it will become important to identify the practices 
of constitutional courts, as both national and international actors.  This Article 
has shown not only that such a line might not be clear but also that the 
principal concern now articulated by opponents of comparative constitutional 
adjudication—that national judges will use foreign precedent to undermine 
laws passed by legitimately elected legislators—is only one aspect of the 
problem.  Judges may increasingly view themselves as part of a law-making 
community that includes, but is not limited to, their national role or selection.  
That self-perception has important distributional consequences for internal 
allocations of political power, given that popular checks on judiciaries often 
lack the regularity and strength applied to legislators and executives.   
Justice Anand appeared fairly unconcerned with this confrontation 
between elected branches and the judiciary.  In D.K. Basu, he quoted the 
following from the 1949 Hamlyn Lecture by Sir Alfred Denning: 
 
No one can suppose that the executive will never be guilty of 
the sins that are common to all of us.  You may be sure that they 
will sometimes do things which they ought not to do: and will 
not do things that they ought to do.  But if and when wrongs are 
thereby suffered by any of us what is the remedy?  Our 
procedure for securing our personal freedom is efficient, our 
procedure for preventing the abuse of power is not.  Just as the 
pick and shovel is no longer suitable for the winning of coal, so 
also the procedure of mandamus, certiorari, and actions on the 
case are not suitable for the winning of freedom in the new age.  
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They must be replaced by new and up-to date [sic] machinery, 
by declarations, injunctions and actions for negligence. . . .  
This is not the tasks [sic] of Parliament. . . .  the courts must do 
this.  Of all the great tasks that lie ahead this is the greatest.  
Properly exercised the new powers of the executive lead to the 
welfare state; but abused they lead to a totalitarian state.  None 
such must even be allowed in this country.
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